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 A new model of commitment defense in romantic relationships is proposed.  It assumes 
that relationships afford a central resource for affirming meaning and purpose in the world.  
Consequently, violating expectations about the world outside the relationship can precipitate 
commitment defense inside the relationship.  A meta-analysis of five experiments, two follow-up 
correlational studies, and a longitudinal study of the transition to first parenthood supported the 
model.  Experimentally violating conventional expectations about the world (e.g., “hard work 
pays off”) motivated less satisfied people to defensively affirm their commitment.  Similarly, 
when becoming a parent naturalistically violated culturally conditioned gendered expectations 
about the division of household labor, less satisfied new mothers and fathers defensively 
affirmed their commitment from pre-to-post baby.  The findings suggest that violating expected 
associations in the world outside the relationship motivates vulnerable people to set relationship 
their relationship right, thereby affirming expected associations in the relationship in the face of 
an unexpected world.   
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Love is the delightful interval between meeting a beautiful girl and discovering that she looks 
like a haddock. J. Barrymore (1882-1942) 
 
 Life does not always unfold as expected.  A beloved HBO drama can end with a cryptic 
fade to black, the stock market can rise when it should fall, the diligent can fail while the 
profligate prosper, the innocent can suffer tragedy, and the incompetent and corrupt can ascend 
to political power.  When events in the world run amok, can people restore a sense of expected 
meaning and order through romantic relationships?  Barrymore might not think so.  As he 
intuited, partners often violate one’s expectations, usually to unhappy effect (Eastwick & Neff, 
2015; McNulty, 2010; McNulty & Karney, 2004; Murray, Griffin, Derrick, Harris, Aloni, & 
Leder, 2011).  Nevertheless, the very power partners have to violate expectations may also turn 
relationships into a ripe canvas for setting violated expectations about how the world works right.  
This paper presents a new model of commitment-defense that reveals that violating worldly 
expectations can motivate people in disappointing relationships to embrace commitment. 
Motivating Action:  In Defense of Meaning    
The world needs to make sense for people to act purposefully within it.  The world has 
meaning when people perceive the associations in the world that their past experiences condition 
them to expect, as happens when ice is cold, puppies are playful, fruits are inanimate, new 
mothers are harried, perpetrators are punished, and relationships are fulfilling and committed 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006).  Because goal-directed behavior depends on the perception of 
meaning, and meaning depends on the perception of expected associations, unexpected 
associations induce uncertainty and inhibit action (Brickman, 1987; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-
Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Jonas, McGregor, Klackl, Agroskin, Fritsche, Holbrook, Nash, 
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Proulx, & Quirin, 2011; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 
Schmeichel, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2011; McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010; Proulx, 
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; Randles, Inzlicht, Proulx, Tullett, & 
Heine, 2015; Schneider, Eerland, van Harreveld, Rotteveel, Pligt, Stoep, & Zwaan, 2013; Tritt, 
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 
2009; van Harreveld, van der Plight, & de Liver, 2009). 
The action-based model of cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015), the anxiety-
to-approach model of threat and defense (Jonas et al., 2014), and the meaning-maintenance 
model (Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2010; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) describe how people 
alleviate uncertainty when experience violates the meaningful associations they expect to see in 
the world.  In these models, expectancy-inconsistent perceptions elicit aversive arousal (akin to 
anxiety) as a means of motivating people to impose the associations they expect to see on the 
world.  Affirming the expected then restores meaning, thereby alleviating anxiety and removing 
the psychological brake that the expectancy-inconsistent associations put on behavior (Jonas et 
al., 2014; Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011; Randles, Heine, & Santos, 2013).   
The motivation to restore expected associations in the face of expectancy-violating 
experiences is so deeply rooted that it happens fluidly (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010).  Fluid 
compensation means that affirmed consistencies do not need to correct the expectancy violation 
itself to restore meaning and alleviate anxiety (Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010; Randles et al., 
2015).  For instance, people subliminally primed with inconsistent word pairings (e.g., quickly 
blueberry, juicy running) punish hypothetical prostitutes more severely for violating social 
convention, restoring meaning by countering the unexpected in one domain with the expected in 
another (Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2011).  Similarly, people told a tale of hard work resulting in 
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abject failure restore meaning by affirming the expected value of national allegiance (Proulx et 
al., 2010).  Moreover, people confronted with expectancy-inconsistent beliefs about abortion 
restore perceptual order by perceiving meaningful pictures in random dots (van Harreveld, 
Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen, & Keskinis, 2014).  Restoring physical order by returning a messy 
lab room to a pristine state even affords sufficient symbolic meaning to inoculate people against 
anxieties about the unexpectedly inconsistent in their personal lives (van Harreveld et al., 2014). 
In Defense of Relationship Commitment 
Figure 1 integrates assumptions of interdependence (Murray, Holmes & Collins, 2006) 
and uncertainty reduction models (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011; Heine et al., 2006; Jonas et al., 
2014) into a new model of commitment defense in romantic relationships.  It assumes that people 
see satisfying romantic relationships as an intrinsic part of a sensible and meaningful life 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Finkel, Cheong, Emery, Carswell, & Larson, 2015; Heine et al., 
2006).  Consequently, the world makes more sense and life is in better order when people can 
believe that their own romantic relationship is indeed committed and fulfilling.   
Existing research suggests that people are naturally inclined to defuse relationship doubts.  
For instance, people automatically deflect attention from their partner’s unexpected interference 
with their goals by valuing their partner more (Murray, Holmes, Aloni, Pinkus, Derrick, & Leder, 
2009).  They also preempt threats to commitment by automatically sacrificing on their partner’s 
behalf (Righetti, Finkenauer, & Finkel, 2013) and excusing their partner’s transgressions 
(Karremans & Aarts, 2007; Lemay & Melville, 2014; Slotter, Finkel, DeWall, Lambert, Pond, 
Bodenhausen, & Fincham, 2012).  Newlyweds even compensate for the unwanted experience of 
doubting their commitment over time.  Those periods when their commitment is most in doubt 
automatically motivate newlyweds to think and behave in ways in daily life that justify costs and 
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inhibit destructive behavior (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, & Derrick, 2015).  
Interdependence theorists typically conceptualize the preservation of relationship 
commitment as an end unto itself (Rusbult & VanLange, 2003; Murray & Holmes, 2011).  The 
commitment-defense model assumes its preservation is further rooted in the general motivation 
to protect expected associations in the world.  Expected associations refer to experientially 
conditioned expectations – such as puppies are playful, hard work is rewarded, and marriages are 
committed.  Such conditioned expectations impart meaning to events by specifying how the 
world works (Heine et al., 2006).  Expectancy violations refer to unexpected associations or 
experiences that threaten meaning by challenging such conditioned expectations.   
In the commitment-defense model, expectancy violations that challenge the meaningful 
associations people expect to see in the world elicit anxiety and motivate people to restore 
meaning by affirming the expected within the relationship.  This basic tenet of the model 
captures three interrelated assumptions.  The first:  Expectancy violations only threaten meaning 
when they simultaneously challenge expectations about how the world works.  For instance, 
neither the diligent Arya, nor the goldbricking Aaron, might expect to lose a job.  But, such a 
loss only challenges expected associations between hard work and reward for the diligent, 
motivating Arya to impose orderly and expected associations within her relationship.   
The second:  Approach-oriented relationship sentiments that instill meaning and drive to 
behavior are more natural candidates for restoring compensatory meaning and order to the 
relationship than avoidance-oriented sentiments that inhibit it.  In romantic relationships, 
commitment and trust fulfill such respective motivational roles (Murray & Holmes, 2009; 2011).  
Commitment captures the perceiver’s own intentions to maintain the relationship, whereas trust 
captures the perceiver’s perceptions of the partner’s intentions to maintain the relationship 
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(Murray & Holmes, 2009; Wieselquist et al., 1999).  Because people can be more certain of the 
contents of their own mind than the contents of their partner’s mind (Griffin & Ross, 1991), 
commitment functions as a more approach-motivated, purpose-driven relationship sentiment than 
trust (Brickman, 1987; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006).  Indeed, 
commitment imbues action with such a resolute sense of meaning and purpose that strong 
commitments automatically motivate people to put caring for their partner ahead of pursuing 
self-interested temptations (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).  However, trust tracks reasons to be 
vigilant, cautious, and avoidant in relationships (Murray & Holmes, 2009).  It is such a sensitive 
barometer of anxiety that even being physically shaky can cause people to question their trust in 
their partner’s caring (Forest, Kille, Wood, & Stehouwer, 2015).  Consequently, when 
expectancy violations impose disorder on the world, trust is functionally poised to mirror anxiety 
about the unexpected within the relationship, while commitment is functionally poised to restore 
order and deflect anxiety about the world through the relationship.   
Third:  Violating the associations that people expect to see in the world should push 
commitment psychologically apart from trust because people need to find greater relative 
meaning and value in their commitment to deflect and neutralize heightened anxiety about 
uncertainty in the relationship.  Path A in Figure 1 captures the commitment-defense model’s 
assumption that people restore expected associations to their relationship, and thus the world, by 
affirming their own feelings of commitment in the face of comparative anxiety about their 
partner’s commitment.  This prediction may seem paradoxical.  In the normal course of events, 
people are usually hesitant to commit when they question their partner’s commitment to them 
(Derrick, Leonard & Homish, 2012; Murray et al., 2006; Overall & Sibley, 2008).  But, when 
trust mirrors the anxiety provoked by the unexpected in the world, it may need to lose its hold 
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over commitment for people to impose the compensatory meaning and order they now need to 
see in their relationship to deflect anxiety about the unexpected in the world. 
The Moderating Role of Actual-Attitude Desired-Attitude Consistency 
When expectancies are violated, threatened perceivers impose associations they expect 
on targets that need to be restored to meaningful order (Heine et al., 2006).  For instance, 
meaning threats motivate people to restore order to the world by punishing people who reject 
social convention.  Not all relationships can function as the palliative equivalent of social 
deviants, though.  Some deviate more from consensual expectations that relationships should be 
fulfilling and provide a sense of meaning in life.  When expectancy violations impose disorder 
on the world at large, such disordered relationships should afford more pressing targets for 
imposing the associations and meaning people expect in the relationship. 
Path B in Figure 1 captures this moderation hypothesis.  It assumes that the power 
expectancy violations in the world have to compel commitment-defense in the relationship 
depends on the consistency between actual and desired attitudes toward the relationship, as 
captured by satisfaction.  People who are highly satisfied in their relationship live in a relatively 
orderly and meaningful state.  They inhabit a relationship that meets expectations for a good and 
meaningful life in most respects (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).  
Consequently, when expectancy violations threaten established associations in the world, people 
who are highly satisfied have relatively little to set right in their relationship.  The simple fact of 
being in a meaningful, rewarding, and committed relationship should be all it takes to defuse 
anxiety and remind them that the world really is full of its expected meaning and purpose.  
Therefore, more satisfied perceivers should not need to further fortify commitment to deflect 
anxiety and affirm meaning; their relationships are already meaningful. 
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However, less satisfied people live in a comparatively disordered, dissonant, and 
meaningless state.  They live in a relationship that is not necessarily one they expected or wanted 
to inhabit (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).  In the commitment-defense model, 
the dissonance that comes from living in such a disordered state intensifies the motivation to 
impose expected associations on the relationship.  Consequently, when expectancy violations 
threaten established associations in the world outside the relationship, less satisfied perceivers 
should grasp upon an obvious opportunity to set their relationship right.  Namely, they should 
impose the associations they expect to see within their relationship by convincing themselves 
that the relationship they already inhabit is indeed the one they want despite their doubts.  In 
other words, less satisfied perceivers can restore the meaning they expect to see in the world at 
large by reactively affirming the expected strength of their commitment.  The motivational 
pressure to fortify relationship commitment in the face of uncertainty in the world should also 
increase proportionate to their level of dissatisfaction (because lower satisfaction signals greater 
incongruity in the relationship to be set right).  Consistent with this motivational logic, people 
who hold attitudes different than those they expect and desire experience considerable angst and 
they are highly susceptible to even subtle pressures to change these attitudes (DeMarree, Rios, 
Randell, Wheeler, Reich, & Petty, 2016; DeMarree, Wheeler, Brinol, & Petty, 2014; Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011).  
Overview and Hypotheses 
The commitment-defense model advances the novel hypothesis that less satisfied people 
bolster relationship commitments to protect the associations they expect (and need) to see in the 
world to behave purposefully within it.  We present a meta-analysis of five experiments (N = 
1742), two follow-up surveys, and a longitudinal study of first parenthood as tests of the model.  
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In the experiments, we violate experientially conditioned expectations about how the world 
works and then measure commitment and trust.  In the surveys, we document that less satisfied 
people are in fact disquieted by their state and motivated to feel differently.  In the transition to 
parenthood study, we examine how naturally occurring violations of gendered expectations about 
the division of household labor predict changes in commitment and trust and motivational 
preparedness to meet the partner’s needs after the baby is born.   
Across studies, we expected violating expectancies about how the world works to 
motivate less satisfied people to defensively affirm commitment, pushing it apart from trust.  In 
other words, we expected expectancy violations and satisfaction to interact in predicting 
compensatory affirmations of commitment.  This moderation hypothesis subsumes two 
interrelated effects.  First, less satisfied people should evidence greater compensatory 
commitment when their expectations about how the world works are violated than when their 
expectations are confirmed.  Second, violating expectations about how the world works should 
attenuate differences in commitment between more and less satisfied people because less 
satisfied people need to set their relationships right to compensate for disorder in the world. 
The Experiments:  Violating Expectations in the “Lab” 
 Experiments 1 through 4 used established meaning threats to violate expectations about 
how the world works.  Experimental participants read a story about hard work come to naught in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (Proulx et al., 2010), watched a disjointed movie in Experiment 3 (Randles 
et al., 2013) and viewed surreal art in Experiment 4 (Proulx et al., 2010).  Experiment 5 violated 
behavioral expectations about how the world works (Chen & Bargh, 1999).  Experimental 
participants used a joystick to physically simulate approaching negative and avoiding positive 
stimuli (rather than approaching positive and avoiding negative stimuli as expected).   
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We then measured commitment and trust.  In keeping with investment (Rusbult & Van 
Lange, 2003), risk regulation (Murray et al., 2006), and motivation-management models of 
interdependence (Murray & Holmes, 2009; 2011), we conceptualized commitment as a sense of 
psychological attachment to the relationship that motivates intentions to sustain it; we 
conceptualized trust as a meta-perspective on the strength of the partner’s psychological 
attachment to the relationship and motivation to sustain it.  Accordingly, we operationalized 
commitment through measures of commitment, closeness, and relationship centrality and trust 
through measures of partners’ perceived commitment and perceived closeness.   
Because we designed the five experiments as conceptual replications, we depart from the 
historical norm to present each individually.  Following on recommendations to use meta-
analysis to evaluate replicability (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Chan & Arvey, 2012; 
Goh et al., 2016; Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016; Stroebe, 2016), we present them as a collective.  
We first describe the participants, methods, and measures.  We then discuss the meta-analytic 
results (N = 1742) and table the results for individual experiments.  We treat the experiments as a 
cumulative model test to ensure that we interpret only statistically robust effects.   
Method   
Participants 
 Experiments 1 through 4.  We recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk).  We advertised each experiment to workers who had completed 100 HITS or more, had 
a HIT approval rate of 95% or greater, and had not completed any other MTurk study conducted 
by our laboratory.  Eligible participants had to be in a romantic relationship at least four months 
in length, US citizens, and speak English as a first language.  Eligible participants were 
automatically ejected from the experiment prior to completion if they failed one of the attention 
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check questions (N = 99).  Participants received $0.50 upon completing the experiment.  Across 
the experiments, we dropped 15 total completed participants whose pretest relationship 
satisfaction scores were at the scale minimum of “not at all satisfied” (more than 3 standard 
deviations below the mean)
1
, 30 completed participants who indicated they were actually single 
on the demographics questions, and 1 participant who was an extreme outlier on age.  We 
retained a total of 1528 participants (892 women) across the four experiments (216 in 
Experiment 1, 404 in Experiment 2, 407 in Experiment 3, and 501 in Experiment 4).
2
  
Participants averaged 35.9 years of age (SD = 11.01); relationships averaged 95.8 months in 
length (SD = 106.9).  Participants were married (753), cohabiting (397), engaged (114), or 
exclusively/casually dating (264). 
 Experiment 5.  We recruited participants from the Introductory Psychology subject pool 
of a large mid-western university.  Eligible participants had to be in a romantic relationship at 
least four months in length and speak English as a first language.  We dropped four participants 
who did not complete the joystick procedure, leaving 214 (110 women).  Participants averaged 
21.6 years of age (SD = 22.5); relationships averaged 19.4 months in length (SD = 2.2).  
Participants received course credit.   
Procedure 
Experiments 1 through 4.  Participants first completed demographic questions and a 1-
item measure of relationship satisfaction (i.e., “How satisfied are you in your relationship?” 1 = 
not at all satisfied, 7 = very satisfied).  Next, they completed self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) and 
attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) scales. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in the expectancy violation condition read an 
abridged version of Kafka’s An Imperial Message.  The messenger in this story prevails over a 
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series of obstacles only to fail to deliver his message in the end, thereby violating the 
conventional expectation that hard work pays off.  Control participants read Aesop’s fable, the 
Tortoise and the Hare, in which the hardworking tortoise triumphs over the lazy hare (Proulx et 
al., 2010, Study 1).  In Experiment 3, participants first watched a filler clip from a Donald Duck 
cartoon.  Expectancy violation participants then watched a 4-minute clip from David Lynch’s 
movie Rabbits, which juxtaposes unexpected dialogue, costuming, and sound effects with a 
familiar sitcom format.  Control participants watched a familiar and easy to understand clip from 
The Wizard of Oz.  All participants then watched a second filler clip from a Peanuts and Snoopy 
cartoon (Randles et al., 2013, Study 2).  In Experiment 4, expectancy violation participants 
viewed Magritte’s The Son of Man, a surrealist piece that depicts familiar images in an 
unexpected arrangement (e.g., an apple floating in front of a face).  Control participants viewed 
Constable’s Landscape with a Double Rainbow, a conventional piece that depicts familiar 
images in an expected arrangement (Proulx et al., 2010, Study 3).   
Participants then completed the dependent measures:  Inclusion of other in the self (Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992), closeness and perceptions of the partner’s closeness, commitment and 
perceptions of the partner’s commitment, relationship centrality, and a 3-item manipulation 
check that asked them to rate how “expected”, “easy or difficult to understand” and “surprising” 
they found the story, movie, or art they experienced.
3
 
Experiment 5.  Participants first completed demographic questions and the 1-item 
measure of relationship satisfaction used in Experiments 1-4.  Next, they completed self-esteem 
(Rosenberg, 1965), need to belong (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013), and 
attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) scales.   
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To violate behavioral expectations, we adapted procedures Kawakami, Phills, Steele and 
Dovidio (2007) utilized to condition approach versus avoidance tendencies.  On each of 480 
trials, one of 24 positive (e.g., giggle, payday, fun, fantastic) and 24 negative (e.g., torture, 
guillotine, HIV, unhappiness) words appeared on the computer screen.  This word remained on 
the screen until participants responded using a joystick.  We varied the nature of the joystick 
response (i.e., push vs. pull) participants made as a function of the valence of the word across 
condition.  In the expectancy violation condition, participants engaged in the physically 
unexpected behavior of pulling negative words towards the self using the joystick (i.e., approach 
negative) and pushing positive words away from the self (i.e., avoiding positive).  Control 
participants instead engaged in the physically expected behavior of using the joystick to pull 
positive towards toward the self (i.e., approach positive) and push negative words away from the 
self (i.e., avoid negative).  The joystick task began with a block of 8 practice trials, followed by 
10 blocks of 48 trials with no delay between trials.  Participants were reminded of task 
instructions at the beginning of each block and incorrect responses received a red “X”.   
All participants then completed the dependent measures:  Inclusion of other in the self, 
closeness and perceptions of the partner’s closeness, security in the partner’s regard, perceptions 
of the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy, relationship centrality, commitment and 
perceptions of the partner’s commitment, predictions for the partner’s trustworthy behavior, 
mood, two exploratory measures,
4
 and a 4-item manipulation check that asked them to rate how 
“uncertain versus certain”, “purposeful versus directionless”, “like I had a clear goal in mind vs. 
did not have a clear goal in mind” and “sure versus unsure of what I was doing” they felt during 
the joystick task.  (The extra time and control afforded in the lab allowed us to include more 
dependent measures than with MTurk).   
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Measures Included in Experiments 1-5  
 Own closeness.  This 5-item measure ( = .92, Murray et al., 2002) tapped the 
participant’s feelings of closeness to the partner (e.g., “I am closer to my partner than any other 
person in my life”; “I would choose to spend time with my partner over anyone else in my life”, 
1 = not at all, 9 = completely true).
5
 
 Perceptions of the partner’s closeness.  This parallel 5-item measure ( = .93) tapped 
the participant’s perceptions of the partner’s feelings of closeness (e.g., “My partner is closer to 
me than any other person in his/her life”; “My partner would choose to spend time with me over 
anyone else in his/her life”). 
Own commitment.  This 3-item measure ( = .93, adapted from Rusbult, Martz & 
Agnew, 1998), tapped the participant’s intentions to sustain the relationship (e.g., “I am 
committed to maintaining my relationship with my partner”; “I want my relationship to last for a 
very long time”, 1 = not at all, 9 = completely true). 
Perceptions of the partner’s commitment.  This parallel 2-item measure ( = .92) 
tapped the participant’s perceptions of the partner’s intentions to sustain the relationship (e.g., 
“My partner is committed to maintaining our relationship”; “My partner wants our relationship 
to last for a very long time”). 
 Relationship centrality.  This 4-item measure ( = .84, adapted from Agnew, Van 
Lange, Rusbult, & Langston, 1998) tapped the relationship’s importance to the participant (“In 
comparison to other parts of your life, such as work, family, friends, religion, how central is your 
relationship with your partner?”, 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely central; “How much time do you 
spend thinking about your relationship with your partner?”, 1 = none at all, 7 = a great deal). 
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Measures Added in Experiment 5 
 Trust in the partner’s regard.  This 15-item measure ( = .83, adapted from Murray et 
al., 2002) tapped the participant’s feelings of trust and security in the partner’s caring (e.g., “I am 
confident that my partner will always see the best in me”; “My partner loves and accepts me 
unconditionally”, 1 = not at all, 9 = completely true). 
 Perceptions of the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy.  This 20-item measure ( 
= .64, adapted from Murray, Holmes & Griffin, 1996) tapped the participant’s perception of their 
partner’s disposition to be trustworthy and responsive (e.g., My partner is… “tolerant and 
accepting”, “thoughtless”, “responsive”, “distant”, “critical and judgmental” (1 = not at all 
characteristic, 9 = completely characteristic). 
  Predictions for the partner’s trustworthy behavior.  This 9-item scale, ( = .73, 
adapted from McNulty & Karney, 2004) asked the participant to predict his/her partner’s future 
likelihood of being trustworthy and responsive (e.g., “My partner will always take time for me 
when I need him/her”; “My partner will sometimes lose his/her temper”; “My partner will 
always take care of me”, 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). 
Results 
In the commitment-defense model, expectancy violations provoke stronger compensatory 
affirmations of commitment (relative to trust) for less satisfied people because they have more in 
the relationship to set right and make meaningful.  Such a moderating effect of satisfaction could 
take two different forms.  With progressively lower satisfaction, expectancy violation 
participants might evidence more compensatory commitment (relative to the control participants).  
Figure 2A presents a potential linear moderating effect of satisfaction.  In this figure, the 
tendency for expectancy violation participants to defensively affirm commitment relative to 
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control participants is linearly lower with higher satisfaction.  Alternately, once satisfaction 
reaches a particular threshold, meaning violations might lose all power to provoke compensatory 
commitment relative to the control condition.  Figure 2B presents a potential quadratic 
moderating effect of satisfaction.  In this figure, the tendency for expectancy violation 
participants to defensively affirm commitment relative to control participants disappears once 
satisfaction is sufficiently high.  Both possibilities are consistent with the theoretical model, and 
so, we tested for both linear and quadratic effects of satisfaction. 
The Compensatory Commitment Composite 
Table 1 presents descriptive information for the study variables.  In each experiment, we 
first computed indices of commitment and trust.  In Experiments 1-5, we computed commitment 
composites by averaging standardized (z-score) responses to own closeness, own commitment, 
and relationship centrality scales (= .90).  In Experiments 1-4, we computed trust composites 
by averaging standardized (z-score) responses to the perceptions of the partner’s closeness and 
perceptions of the partner’s commitment scales (= .93).  In Experiment 5, we computed the 
trust composite by averaging standardized (z-score) responses to the perceptions of the partner’s 
closeness, perceptions of the partner’s commitment, trust in the partner’s regard, perceptions of 
the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy, and predictions for the partner’s trustworthy behavior 
scales (= .79).  In each experiment, we then computed a difference score measure of 
compensatory commitment by subtracting the trust composite from the commitment composite.  
More positive difference scores capture the tendency to report relatively greater feelings of 
commitment than feelings of trust in the partner might seem to justify.   
Regression Analyses for the Individual Experiments 
Within each experiment, we then conducted simultaneous regression analyses predicting 
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the difference score measure of compensatory commitment from the main effects of expectancy 
violation condition, centered satisfaction, centered satisfaction squared, and the interactions 
between expectancy violation condition and satisfaction (both linear and squared terms).  We 
also controlled for the main and interactive effects for self-esteem because low and high self-
esteem people respond differently to self and relationship threats (see Cavallo, Holmes, & 
Murray, 2013 for a review).  Including self-esteem in the analysis allowed us to establish that 
any effects of satisfaction emerged independent of its association with self-esteem and examine 
whether self-esteem moderated the effects of expectancy violation condition and satisfaction.   
Using a difference score to measure compensatory commitment is mathematically 
equivalent to treating commitment and trust as within subjects factors in a multivariate analysis.
6
  
The difference score thus has the advantage of revealing whether substantively different effects 
emerged for commitment and trust (as the commitment-defense model anticipates).  However, a 
positive difference score does confound three distinct ways in which commitment and trust could 
separate (Griffin, Murray & Gonzalez, 1999).  Expectancy violations might (1) increase 
commitment and decrease trust, (2) increase commitment, but leave trust unchanged or (3) 
decrease trust, but leave commitment unchanged, all resulting in a more positive difference score.  
For this reason, we also conducted regression analyses separately predicting commitment and 
trust so we could isolate which pattern of commitment-trust differentiation emerged.  Tables 2 
through 6 present the results for the difference score measure of compensatory-commitment and 
its component indices of commitment and trust for each experiment.
7
  
Meta-Analyzing the Five Experiments 
We used the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA) statistical package to evaluate the 
aggregate support for the model (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, CMA Version 3).  
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We used the t-values and sample sizes from the regression analysis for each individual 
experiment to estimate 95% confidence intervals around the effect size [r] across experiments.  
CMA produces both fixed and random effects estimates.  The fixed effect estimates assume that 
the obtained effects estimate a true effect that is homogenous across populations, and thus, fixed 
effect estimates give greater weight to studies with higher Ns.  The random effect estimates 
assume that the obtained effects estimate true effects that vary across populations, and thus, the 
random effects estimates give equal weight to studies regardless of N.  Because we designed the 
five experiments as conceptual replications estimating a common effect, we report the fixed 
effect estimates (Borestein, Hedges & Rothstein, 2007; Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  The random 
effect estimates produced effect sizes, z statistics, and p values for the primary analyses that 
paralleled the fixed effect estimates (with minor exceptions for trust noted in Footnote 11).   
Table 7 presents the results of the meta-analysis, listing the average effect size, r, 95% 
confidence interval and z-value, for each term in the regression analyses.
8
  The meta-analysis 
revealed a robust interaction between expectancy violation condition and satisfaction (squared) 
predicting the difference score measure of compensatory-commitment (see Table 7).
9
  It also 
revealed opposite and significant interactions between expectancy violation condition and 
satisfaction (squared) separately predicting the commitment and trust composites.   
Figures 3 through 7 plot the association between satisfaction and compensatory-
commitment in the expectancy-violation and control conditions in each experiment.  Using 
Aiken and West (1991) procedures, we decomposed each interaction into its two sets of 
component simple effects.  The simple effects of expectancy violation condition reveal whether 
participants evidence greater compensatory commitment when expectations about how the world 
works are violated than confirmed.  We estimated the strength and direction of this simple effect 
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for experimental condition for participants 2, 1.5, and 1 standard deviations (SD) below the mean 
on satisfaction and 1 SD above the mean on satisfaction (to capture the sample range).  The 
simple effects of satisfaction (squared) reveal whether violating expectations about how the 
world works attenuates pre-existing differences in commitment between more and less satisfied 
people, as the model anticipates.  We estimated the strength and direction of the simple effect 
curvilinear association between satisfaction and compensatory commitment in both expectancy 
violation and control conditions.  We then conducted a parallel set of conditional regressions for 
the commitment and trust composites.  We used the CMA statistical package to aggregate 
conditional tests.  We discuss the simple effects for the difference score and its components next. 
The compensatory-commitment difference score.  The simple effects for expectancy 
violation condition revealed that less satisfied participants defensively affirmed commitment 
relative to controls.  That is, less satisfied participants in the expectancy violation condition 
evidenced greater compensatory commitment than controls.  The meta-analytic simple effect of 
expectancy condition was significant for participants 2 standard deviations (SD), r = .108, 95% 
CI [.061, .155], z = 4.52, p < .0001, and 1.5 SD below the mean on satisfaction, r = .08, 95% CI 
[.033, .126], z = 3.32, p = .001.  However, the simple effect of expectancy violation condition 
was not significant for participants one SD below the mean, r = .023, 95% CI [-.024, .070], z = 
0.95, p = .34, at the mean, r = -.031, 95% CI [-.078, .016], z = -1.28, p = .20, or one SD above 
the mean on satisfaction, r = .029, 95% CI [-.018, .076], z = 1.19, p = .23. 
The simple effects for satisfaction (squared) predicting the difference score revealed that 
violating expectancies attenuated pre-existing commitment differences between more and less 
satisfied participants.  In the control condition, the curvilinear effect of satisfaction predicting 
compensatory commitment was significant, r = -.139, 95% CI [-.184, -.092], z = -5.80, p < .0001.  
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Less satisfied control participants were less likely to defensively affirm commitment than more 
satisfied controls and being lower in satisfaction intensified this difference, as captured by the 
curve steepening.  But, in the expectancy violation condition, this intensification disappeared and 
the simple effect of satisfaction (squared) was not significant, r = .006, 95% CI [-.041, .053], z = 
0.25, p = .80.  Thus, violating expectancies motivated less satisfied participants to make 
affirmations of commitment that more closely resembled more satisfied participants.
10
   
The commitment and trust components.  Decomposing the interactions for the 
commitment and trust composites generally revealed that expectancy violations pushed 
commitment apart from trust by increasing commitment while decreasing trust. 
 The meta-analytic findings for commitment generally mirrored the difference score 
findings, although the simple effects for satisfaction (squared) yielded stronger effects.  
Expectancy violation participants tended to report greater commitment than controls when 
participants were 2.0 SD, r = .035, 95% CI [-.012, .082], z = 1.47, p = .14, and 1.5 SD below the 
mean on satisfaction, r = .02, 95% CI [-.027, .067), z = 0.85, p = .40, although neither effect was 
significant.  In the control condition, less satisfied participants reported less commitment than 
more satisfied participants and being lower in satisfaction intensified this difference, r = -.071, 
95% CI [-.117, -.023], z = -2.94, p = .003.  However, this intensification disappeared in the 
expectancy violation condition and less satisfied participants reported commitment levels that 
more closely resembled satisfied participants, r = -.019, 95% CI [-.066, .028], z = -0.78, p = .43.   
The meta-analytic findings for trust presented a mirror opposite to the difference score 
findings.  Expectancy violation participants reported less trust than control participants when 
participants were 2.0 SD, r = -.070, 95% CI [-.117, -.023], z =  -2.93, p = .003, and 1.5 SD below 
the mean on satisfaction, r = -.060, 95% CI [-.107, -.013], z = -2.49, p = .013.  In the control 
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condition, less satisfied participants reported less trust than more satisfied participants, but the 
slope of this curve flattened at lower satisfaction, r = .058, 95% CI [.011, .105], z = 2.41, p 
= .016.  In the expectancy violation condition, this mitigation disappeared, r = -.025, 95% CI[-
.072, .022], z = -1.05, p = .29, and less satisfied participants uniformly reported less trust than 
more satisfied participants.
11
   
Manipulation Check 
The meta-analytic test of the main effect for experimental condition predicting the 
manipulation check was significant.  Expectancy violation participants described their 
experiences as more unexpected, surprising, and confusing than control participants, r = .440, 




 The experiments suggest that vulnerable people can affirm the associations they expect to 
see in the world by defending relationship commitments.  When people were less satisfied in 
their relationships, violating conventional expectations that hard work pays off, stories unfold in 
an orderly fashion, art resembles something real, and good things are approached and bad things 
avoided pushed commitment apart from trust.  Less satisfied participants in the expectancy 
violation conditions compensated and affirmed commitment over trust (relative to less satisfied 
control participants).  From the perspective of the model, such compensatory bolstering of 
commitment over trust represents a palliative defense against the uncertainty the meaning 
violation provoked.  The subtlety of the expectancy violations invoked in the experiments makes 
these findings all the more impressive.  Seemingly trivial things that did not turn out exactly as 
expected motivated less satisfied participants to profess commitments that were just as strong as 
those of highly satisfied participants.  Nevertheless, the experiments do have limitations.   
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The first limitation involves our operationalization of commitment and trust.  We 
combined scales tapping commitment, closeness, and centrality in the commitment composite 
and scales tapping perceptions of the partner’s commitment and closeness in the trust composite 
to broadly capture ways in which people can express (or perceive) a sense of psychological 
attachment to the relationship.  However, violating expectancies might have produced effects on 
these composites without actually changing less satisfied participants’ responses on the 
commitment and perceived commitment scales (which bear the closest empirical parallel to our 
conceptual constructs).  To see if this was the case, we redid the meta-analysis using only the 
scales tapping commitment and perceived commitment.  The expectancy violation by satisfaction 
(squared) interactions predicting commitment, r = .049, 95% CI [.002, .096], z = 2.04, p = .042, 
perceived commitment, r = -.052, 95% CI [-.099, -.005], z = -2.17, p = .03, and most crucial, the 
difference between commitment and perceived commitment, r = .107, 95% CI [.060, .153], z = 
4.45, p < .0001, were significant.  Indeed, the experiments revealed more consistent interaction 
effects for this difference score measure of compensatory commitment than the full measure.
13
 
The second limitation involves the differences between the fixed and random effects 
estimates for the expectancy violation by satisfaction (squared) interaction predicting trust.  We 
designed the experiments as conceptual replications estimating a common effect size, making the 
fixed effects appropriate (Borestein, Hedges & Rothstein, 2007; Goh, Hall & Rosenthal, 2016; 
Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  However, the meta-analysis did reveal significant variability across 
experiments in the size of the interaction effect for trust.  This suggests that expectancy 
violations might not always have an equally robust effect in suppressing trust for less satisfied 
people.  Nevertheless, as expected, the direction and magnitude of the expectancy violation by 
satisfaction (squared) interactions for the commitment and trust composites differed significantly 
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from each other across studies for both the fixed and random effects estimates (see Footnote 6).  
Moreover, the fixed and random effects estimates for the expectancy violation by satisfaction 
(squared) interaction separately predicting the commitment composite were identical.  Thus, the 
experiments clearly show that expectancy violations push commitment apart from trust for less 
satisfied people.  They are less clear in deciphering when trust will be actively inhibited in 
response to expectancy violations.   
The third limitation involves the rationale for predicting satisfaction moderation.  In the 
commitment-defense model, living in a relatively more disordered and senseless state heightens 
the motivation to make sense of the world.  Consequently, when expectancy violations further 
threaten meaning, less satisfied people defensively affirm the inherent value of their relationship 
commitments to deflect anxiety and restore meaning and order to the world.  This prediction 
assumes that less satisfied people are disaffected with the current disorderly state of their 
relationship and motivated to change it.  However, this contention seems inconsistent with 
longstanding research suggesting that less satisfied people think and behave in ways that 
maintain distress, not alleviate it (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990; Karney & Bradbury, 1995).  
Therefore, we conducted two follow-up surveys to check on the validity of our assumption that 
less satisfied people are highly motivated to change the way they feel about their relationship 
because they live in such an experientially disordered state. 
Dissatisfied and Disordered?  First Check on the Validity of Our Assumptions 
 For the follow-up surveys, we recruited two MTurk samples (Sample A, N = 295, Sample 
B, N = 296) using the same inclusion criteria as the experiments (338 Women).  Participants 
averaged 35.3 years in age (SD = 11.3); relationships averaged 96.0 months in length (SD = 
107.4), and participants were married (294), cohabiting (139), engaged (60), or dating (98). 
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 In both surveys, participants completed demographics and the 1-item measure of 
satisfaction from the experiments.  Participants then completed a desire to change relationship 
attitudes measure modeled after existing measures of desired attitudinal change (DeMarree et al., 
2011; DeMarree et al., 2016).  For survey A, participants responded to the question, “Is your 
level of satisfaction the same or different than the level of satisfaction you want to experience.” 
Those who answered “different” then indicated whether they wanted to feel more or less 
positively.   For survey B, participants indicated whether “high in satisfaction” describes how 
they (1) actually, (2) want or desire, and (3) ought to feel about their relationship (1 = not at all, 
7 = absolutely).  Participants in both surveys also completed 3-items ( = .81) capturing 
dissonant feelings about their level of satisfaction (i.e., “When I think about how satisfied I am in 
my romantic relationship right now, I feel…  “uncomfortable”, “uneasy”, “bothered”, 1 = not at 
all, 7 = very, Elliot & Devine, 1994) and the 10-item meaning in life questionnaire (e.g., “My life 
has a clear sense of purpose”, Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006).   
Do Less Satisfied People Want to Feel Differently? 
We first identified participants who wanted to experience a different level of relationship 
satisfaction.  For Survey A, we labeled participants who expressed preferences for a “different” 
attitude as the desired attitudinal change group, coded 1 (N = 95); the vast majority (90%) 
desired a more positive attitude.  We labeled participants who expressed preferences for the 
“same” attitude as the desired attitudinal stability group, coded 0.  For Survey B, we averaged 
responses to the “want” and “ought” to feel items to create a measure of desired “high in 
satisfaction” attitudes.  We then labeled participants whose desire to feel “high in satisfaction” 
exceeded their actual “high in satisfaction” sentiments as the desired positive attitudinal change 
group, coded 1 (N = 113) and the remainder as the desired attitudinal stability group, coded 0.  
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Table 8 presents the descriptive information and Table 9 presents the zero-order 
correlations among the measures.  Less satisfied people expressed stronger desires to change 
relationship attitudes than more satisfied people.  On Survey A, less satisfied people were 
significantly more likely to want different attitudes than more satisfied people, r (293) = -.57, p 
< .0001.  On Survey B, less satisfied people were significantly more likely to report desires to be 
“high in satisfaction” that exceeded their actual sentiments, r (294) = -.44, p < .0001. 
Do Less Satisfied People Want to Change Because They Live in a Disordered State? 
 To answer this question, we estimated the mediation model presented in Figure 8.   In 
both surveys, we sought to establish that less satisfied people report a diminished sense of 
meaning in life (Path A), having a diminished sense of meaning in life predicts more dissonant 
feelings about the relationship (Path B), and that experiencing more dissonant and disquieting 
feelings about the relationship supplies the desire for change in relationship attitudes (Path C).  
This model thus specifies an indirect A-B-C mediation effect such that less satisfied people want 
to change their relationship attitudes because their relationship provides so little meaning that 
their dissatisfaction becomes a motivating source of dissonance and disquiet.   
We used maximum likelihood estimation procedures within the structural equation 
modeling program AMOS to estimate the mediation model in each study.  Table 10 presents the 
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals for all paths in the mediation model for each survey 
sample (sampling 500 iterations in a parametric bootstrap).  As expected, less satisfied people 
perceived significantly less meaning in life (Path A), perceiving less meaning in life predicted 
significantly more dissonant relationship feelings (Path B), and more dissonant feelings predicted 
significantly greater desire to change (Path C).  Moreover, the experience of meaningless and 
dissonance mediated the association between satisfaction and the desire to be more satisfied.  
 27 
That is, the A-B-C indirect mediation path was significant in both Survey A, 95% CI (-.083, -
.032), p = .002, and Survey B, 95% CI (- .065, -.011), p = .003.  However, a significant direct 
effect of satisfaction on desire to change also emerged in Survey A, 95% CI (-.234, -.133), p 
= .008, and Survey B, 95% CI (-.211, -.100), p = .007, suggesting partial mediation.  Even 
though these data cannot prove causality and other mediation models could be possible, they 
nevertheless help explain why less satisfied people would defensively affirm commitment in 
response to expectancy violations.  The unadulterated relationship sentiments of less satisfied 
people are simply not positive enough to affirm the presence of meaning in the relationship, and 
thus, the presence of meaning and order in the world.  But, defensively affirming commitment 
gives less satisfied people a way to see meaning in both the relationship and the world.
14
   
The Transition to Parenthood:  Violating Expectations in “Life” 
 There are probably few events in life that can violate established expectations about how 
the world works more profoundly than the birth of a first baby (Finkel, 2014).  New parents not 
only sleep, shower, and eat less than they expect human beings to sleep, shower, and eat, but 
they also experience drops in personal happiness (Clark, Diener, Georgellis, & Lucas, 2008) and 
relationship satisfaction (Doss et al., 2009) that persist as they acclimate to their new normal.   
The transition to parenthood thus provides a naturalistic laboratory for conducting a real-
life replication of the experiments (Maner, 2015).  In this study, expectant couples completed 
measures of satisfaction, commitment, and trust and they reported expectations for the division 
of household and childcare responsibility after their baby was born.  They returned to the lab 
four months after birth to report on the actual division of responsibilities and complete follow-up 
measures of commitment and trust.  They also participated in conflict discussions while their 
cardiovascular responses were monitored and then evaluated one another’s responsiveness.   
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Although using this real-life transition to test the model hypotheses is noisier and more 
susceptible to alternate explanation than any controlled experiment, it has two counterweighing 
upsides.  In the commitment-defense model, violating the associations that people expect to see 
in the world motivates compensatory affirmations of commitment as a means of restoring order 
and meaning to the world.  However, the experiments implicitly confounded the violation of a 
personal expectation with the violation of an expected association in the world.  Unlike the 
experiments, the transition to parenthood provides a way to distinguish the effects of violating 
personal expectations from the effects of violating expected associations in the world.   
Parents-to-be possess expectations for the post-baby division of household labor and 
childcare that are both concrete and personally important (Hackel & Ruble, 1998).  When post-
baby realities violate such personal expectations, they can do so in ways that either affirm or 
challenge expected associations in the world.  Women, and especially new mothers, generally 
take greater responsibility for household labor than men (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010; 
Freudenthatler & Mikula, 1998).  Consequently, when mothers-to-be expect to take less 
responsibility for domestic labor post-baby than they actually end up taking, such an under-
estimate violates a personal expectation, but it ultimately affirms the expected gendered division 
of labor in the world at large.  Similarly, when fathers-to-be expect to take more responsibility 
for domestic labor post-baby than they actually end up taking, such an over-estimate violates a 
personal expectation, but it also affirms the expected gendered association in the world.  But, 
when mothers-to-be expect to take more responsibility for domestic labor post-baby than they 
actually end up taking, such an over-estimate both violates a personal expectation and challenges 
culturally conditioned, gendered expectations about how the world works, namely the 
expectation that women do more.  Similarly, when fathers-to-be expect to take less responsibility 
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for domestic labor post-baby than they end up taking, such an under-estimate violates a personal 
expectation and also challenges gendered expectations about how the world works, namely the 
expectation that men do less.  In the commitment-defense model, new parents should only 
defensively affirm commitment when expectations violations threaten perceptions of meaning 
and order because they challenge normative gendered expectations for the division of labor. 
The experiments posed “one-dose” expectancy violations with small, but detectable, 
effects on commitment and trust.  Unlike the experiments, the transition to parenthood could 
pose “multi-dose” expectancy violations as allocating the ongoing flood of household and 
childcare confounds gendered expectations about the division of labor over the initial days and 
weeks of parenthood.  The sustained nature of the expectancy violations some new parents may 
face affords an even more conservative test of the commitment-defense logic.  If violating 
expectations about how the world works motivates less satisfied people to defensively affirm 
commitment to restore meaning and order to the world, successively bolstering commitments in 
the face of such violations should also make their relationships more meaningful and orderly.
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The parenthood study allowed us to measure such transformations in relationships 
through (1) self-reported changes in commitment and trust over the transition to parenthood and 
(2) motivational preparedness to meet the partner’s needs in conflict-of-interest situations 
(Murray & Holmes, 2009; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Simpson, 2007).  In the commitment-
defense model, less satisfied people should imbue greater meaning to their commitment when 
parental domesticity challenges gendered associations for how the world works.  If relationship 
commitment has indeed come to have greater meaning to less satisfied people who experience 
such challenging expectancy violations, changes in commitment should not be ephemeral.  They 
should still be evident months after the baby’s birth.  Less satisfied people should also be better 
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motivationally prepared to meet their partner’s needs in a conflict-of-interest situation.   
Specifically, they should be physiologically emboldened, rather than threatened, by the prospect 
of accommodating to their partner’s needs and their partner should also perceive them to be 
behaving more responsively in conflict-of-interest situations. 
According to the biopsychosocial model of challenge/threat, cardiovascular responses can 
reveal a person’s motivational preparedness to succeed in a test of will, such as inhibiting the 
inclination to be selfish and instead accommodate to a partner’s needs (Blascovich, 2008; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Seery, 2011; 2013).  In such testing situations, people experience a 
state of psychological challenge when they evaluate high personal resources and low situational 
demands.  They experience relative threat when they evaluate low resources and high demands. 
Four cardiovascular measures measure challenge/threat: heart rate (HR); ventricular contractility 
(VC), a measure of the left ventricle’s contractile force; cardiac output (CO), the amount of 
blood pumped by the heart in liters/min; and total peripheral resistance (TPR), a measure of net 
constriction/dilation in the arterial system.  When people experience greater challenge (reflecting 
motivational preparedness to succeed), their heart works more efficiently, captured through 
higher cardiac output (CO) and lower total peripheral resistance (TPR) than threat.
16
  Thus, 
people who are truly more committed to their partner should be physiologically emboldened and 
exhibit relative cardiovascular challenge rather than threat when conflicts-of-interest put their 
commitment to the test.  
The transition to parenthood study thus afforded hypothesis tests that conceptually 
replicated and extended the experiments.  Namely, less satisfied new mothers should compensate 
and defensively affirm commitment, pushing commitment psychologically apart from trust, 
when they over-estimate their post-baby responsibilities (because such a violation challenges 
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expectations that women should do more).  However, less satisfied fathers should compensate 
when they under-estimate their post-baby responsibilities (because such a violation challenges 
expectations that men should do less).  The greater meaning less satisfied people who experience 
such expectancy violations find in their relationships should be evident in increases in self-
reported commitment and greater motivational preparedness to meet their partner’s needs.  But, 
when mothers under-estimate and fathers over-estimate post-baby responsibilities, such 
affirmations of expected associations in the world should not motivate commitment defense. 
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred two first-time expectant couples participated in a longitudinal study of the 
transition to parenthood in upstate New York.  One hundred forty-eight couples returned to the 
laboratory for the post-assessment (1 miscarried, 3 separated, 1 spouse died, and 47 became 
uninterested or unreachable between pre- and post-birth assessments).  The sample was 
predominantly White (4.70% African American, 1.49% Asian, 3.22% Hispanic 86.39% White, 
3.96% other) and couples were either married (72.03%), engaged (8.17%) or cohabiting 
(19.80%).  Participants averaged 28.73 (SD = 4.66) years in age and relationships averaged 36.49 
(SD = 31.10) months in length pre-birth.  The median household income ranged from $20,001-
$35,000 per year.  Participants received payment at each time point.  
Procedure 
 We recruited expectant couples through advertisements placed in local newspapers, 
Craigslist and Facebook and through visits to prenatal classes.  To be eligible, expectant couples 
had to be expecting a first child (for both), residing in the same residence, cohabiting no more 
than 15 years, and able to access the internet at home.  Both couple members completed the 
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Time 1 assessments 5.80 (SD = 2.03) weeks pre-birth and the Time 2 assessments 15.93 (SD = 
3.26) weeks post-birth. 
 Prior to the Time 1 and Time 2 laboratory sessions, participants individually completed a 
questionnaire at home tapping self-perception (i.e., depression, dispositional trustworthiness and 
responsiveness), personality (i.e., attachment style, BIS/BAS, Big 5 personality traits, self-
control, regulatory focus, and need for cognition), perceptions of the ideal partner, perceptions of 
the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy, and a measure of cumulative lifetime adversity.   
At the Time 1 laboratory session, participants individually completed a digit span test 
assessing working memory and Implicit Association and GNAT tests assessing automatic partner 
attitudes.  Next, they completed self-report measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) and 
relationship evaluations that included the measures of own closeness ( = .86), perceptions of 
the partner’s closeness ( = .91), own commitment ( = .87), perceptions of the partner’s 
commitment ( = .93), and inclusion of other in the self used in Experiments 1-5 as well as 
further measures of trust, satisfaction, perceived regard, conflict, and problem severity
17
.  
Participants also completed questions tapping current and expected division of housework post-
birth, expected division of childcare post-birth, and expectations for infant temperament, 
relationship quality, and parenting styles post-birth.  Finally, they reported on activity and task 
preferences and experienced stress. At Time 2, participants completed a reduced set of measures, 
including a measure of the actual division of childcare responsibilities, before discussing 
problems in their relationship while their cardiovascular responses were assessed. 
To prepare for this interaction, each member of the couple first nominated an area of 
difficulty in the relationship he/she wanted to resolve (using the inventory of marital problems, 
McNulty & Russell, 2010).  Each partner then entered a separate recording room where a 
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graduate assistant attached the cardiovascular sensors.  Although in separate rooms, partner 
could see one another via video and communicate via intercom.  After a 5-minute resting 
baseline, couples spent 2-minutes discussing activities for the upcoming weekend (to increase 
comfort talking over the intercom).  Next, they engaged in two 8-minute conflict discussions, 
one for each partner’s nominated area of difficulty.  (A coin toss determined whose issue they 
discussed first).  Participants then completed a self-report measure tapping their partner’s and 
their own responsiveness during the conflict interactions. The interaction concluded with a 2-




Challenge/threat.  Cardiovascular measures were recorded noninvasively, following 
accepted guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990).  We used equipment manufactured and/or 
distributed by Biopac Systems, Inc (Goleta, CA): NICO100C impedance cardiography (ICG) 
noninvasive cardiac output module, ECG100C electrocardiogram (ECG) amplifier, and 
NIBP100A/B noninvasive blood pressure module.  ICG signals were detected with a tetrapolar 
aluminum/mylar tape electrode system, recording basal transthoracic impedance (Z0) and the 
first derivative of impedance change (dZ/dt), sampled at 1kHz. ECG signals were detected using 
a Standard Lead II electrode configuration (additional spot electrodes on the right arm and left 
leg, with ground provided by the ICG system), sampled at 1kHz.  The blood pressure monitor 
was wrist-mounted, collecting continual readings—every 10-15 seconds—from the radial artery 
of participants’ nondominant arm.  In combination, ICG and ECG recordings allowed 
computation of HR, VC (for presentational purposes, pre-ejection period reactivity × -1), and 
CO; the addition of blood pressure monitoring allowed computation of TPR (mean arterial 
pressure × 80 / CO; Sherwood et al., 1990).  Recorded measurements of cardiovascular function 
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were analyzed off-line with Biopac Acqknowledge 3.9.2 for Macintosh software, using 
techniques comparable to those from previously published challenge/threat research with the 
same equipment configuration (e.g., Lupien, Seery, & Almonte, 2012; Seery, Leo, Lupien, 
Kondrak, & Almonte, 2013; Shimizu, Seery, Weisbuch, & Lupien, 2011; also see Seery, 
Kondrak, Streamer, Saltsman & Lamarche, 2016)), including ensemble averaging in 60 s 
intervals (Kelsey & Guethlein, 1990). This approach is comparable to techniques used in other 
challenge/threat work (e.g., de Wit, Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012; 
Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, 2009; Moore, Vine, Wilson, & Freeman, 2012; 2014; Turner, Jones, 
Sheffield, & Cross, 2012; Turner et al., 2013; Vine, Freeman, Moore, Chandra-Ramanan, & 
Wilson, 2013).  Scoring of cardiovascular data was performed blind to other participant data.  
Reactivity was calculated by subtracting the value of the last minute of the first baseline from the 
mean of the minutes for each task (see Llabre, Spitzer, Saab, Ironson, & Schneiderman, 1991, for 
psychometric justification for the use of change scores in psychophysiology). Extreme values 
greater than 3.3 SDs from the mean (p = .001 in a normal distribution; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996) were winsorized by changing their values to 1% above the next-highest non-extreme value. 
This maintained rank order in the distribution while decreasing the influence of extreme values. 
Partner responsiveness during conflict.  This 10-item scale ( = .94) asked participants 
to rate their partner’s caring and responsiveness during the conflict interaction (e.g., “How 
willing was your partner to compromise?”; “How responsive was your partner to your needs?”; 
“How selfishly did your partner behave?”, reversed, 1 = not at all, 7 = very). 
Satisfaction.  This 4-item scale ( = .91, Murray, Griffin et al., 2011) tapped satisfaction 
in the relationship (e.g., “I am extremely satisfied with my relationship”; “I have a very strong 
relationship with my partner”, 1 = not at all true, 9 = completely true). 
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 Trust in the partner’s regard.  This 18-item scale ( = .95, expanded from Murray et 
al., 2015) tapped the participant’s feelings of trust and security in the partner’s caring (e.g., “I am 
confident that my partner will always be able to see the best in me”; “I feel that my partner can 
be counted on to help me”; “I wonder whether my partner feels as strongly for me as I feel for 
him/her”, 1 = not at all, 9 = completely true). 
 Perceptions of the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy.  The 20-item scale ( 
= .87) used in Experiment 5 tapped perceptions of the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy and 
responsive (1 = not at all characteristic, 9 = completely characteristic). 
 Expected responsibility.  Administered pre-birth, 12 items ( = .66) asked participants 
to indicate the percent (0%-100%) of responsibility they expected to take for specific household 
and childcare tasks after the baby was born (i.e., “laundry”, “cleaning”, “cooking”, “shopping”, 
“dishes”, “paying bills”, “keeping track of social activities and obligations with friends/family”, 
“diapering our baby”, “getting up at night with our baby”, “feeding our baby”, “playing with our 
baby”, “soothing our baby”). (Media lab coded the percentages on a 1-11 point scale).   
Actual responsibility.  Administered post-birth, 12 identical items ( = .63) asked 
participants to indicate the percent (0-100%) of responsibility they were now actually taking for 
the same household and childcare tasks.    
Results 
The commitment-defense model predicts less satisfied parents will defensively affirm 
commitment when post-baby realities violate gendered expectations about how the world works.   
In proceeding, we first established that parents-to-be do indeed expected the post-baby division 
of labor to be gendered and that the actual gendered division of labor typically provided even 
more confirmation of a gendered post-baby world order than new parents already expected.  We 
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then contrasted the effects of expectancy violations that either affirm or challenge gendered 
expectations about how the world works.  We first looked at changes in compensatory 
commitment (and its component measures of commitment and trust) and then turned to 
motivational preparedness to meet the partner’s needs.  Table 11 presents descriptive information 
for the self-report variables. 
Measuring Expectancy Violations 
The parents-to-be in this sample possessed gendered expectations about how the post-
baby world works.  Mothers-to-be (M = 7.56) expected to take on significantly more domestic 
responsibility than fathers-to-be (M = 6.29), t(201) = 11.24, p < .0001.  New mothers (M = 7.92) 
also took on significantly more domestic responsibility than new fathers (M = 5.17), t(142) = 
17.32, p < .0001.  In fact, the post-baby division of labor typically ended up even more gendered 
than these new parents expected.  The interaction between gender (women vs. men) and nature 
of judgment (expected vs. actual) was significant in a 2 X 2 within-person ANOVA, F(1,142) = 
103.6, p < .0001.  Typically, women ended up taking on even more responsibility post-baby (M 
= 7.92) than they expected pre-baby (M = 7.61), t(146) = -4.38, p < .0001, and men ended up 
taking even less responsibility post-baby (M = 5.16) than they expected pre-baby (M = 6.24), 
t(143) = 12.18, p < .0001.  Thus, when women under-estimate their responsibilities post-baby, 
doing more than they expected affirms gendered expectations about how the world actually does 
work.  Similarly, when men over-estimate their responsibilities post-baby, doing less than they 
expected also affirms gendered expectations about how the world actually does work.  However, 
when women over-estimate and men under-estimate responsibilities post-baby, the expectancy 
violations they experience challenge such gendered expectations about how the world works.   
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 To capture individual differences in the experience of expectancy violations that either 
affirmed or challenged gendered expectations about how the world works, we calculated residual 
scores.  There are two possible ways to do this:  (1) predict pre-baby expectations for the division 
of labor from the actual division of labor post-baby or (2) predict the actual division of labor 
post-baby from pre-baby expectations for the division of later (Hackel & Ruble, 1992).   
The first approach offers a decided advantage over the second.  In the first approach, the residual 
score is uncorrelated with the actual division of labor, allowing us to separate the effects of 
expecting to do more versus less from the reality of doing more versus less.  In the second 
approach, the residual score is confounded with the actual division of labor, making it impossible 
to separate the reality of doing more (vs. less) from the expectancy violation. 
Accordingly, to capture expectancy violations for women, we saved the residual from a 
regression predicting women’s pre-baby expectations for the division of labor from women’s 
post-baby reports on the actual allocation of labor.  More positive residuals capture expectancy 
violations involving the over-estimation of post-baby responsibilities, a violation of gendered 
expectations about the world for women, but not men.  To capture expectancy violations for men, 
we saved the residual from a regression predicting men’s pre-baby expectations for the division 
of labor from men’s post-baby reports on the actual allocation of labor.  More negative residuals 
capture expectancy violations involving the under-estimation of post-baby responsibilities, a 
violation of cultural expectations for men, but not for women.  We examined both linear and 
quadratic effects of the expectancy violation residual in the analyses because expectancy 
violations that affirm gendered expectations about the world may have a substantively different 
effect than expectancy violations that challenge them, either flattening or steepening any 
otherwise straightforward relation between expectancy violations and the outcome variable.   
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Changes in Compensatory Commitment 
 We computed Time 1 and 2 commitment composites by averaging standardized (z-score) 
responses for own closeness and own commitment (= .65, = .65) and Time 1 and Time 2 
trust composites by averaging standardized (z-score) responses for perceptions of the partner’s 
closeness, perceptions of the partner’s commitment, trust in the partner’s regard, and perceptions 
of the partner’s disposition to be trustworthy (= .88, = .89).
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  We computed a difference 
score measure of compensatory commitment at each time by subtracting trust from commitment. 
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the model hypotheses.  SEM 
accommodates the dyadic structure of data from two partners, allows for tests of gender 
difference (a 1-df 2-square (deviance) test comparing model fit for models with a specific 
parameter constrained vs. unconstrained across gender), and permits the estimation of pooled 
effects across gender in the absence of differences (Kenny, 1996).   
According to the logic of the commitment-defense model, satisfaction and expectancy 
violations (i.e., the expectancy residual) should interact to predict changes in compensatory 
commitment from pre-to-post baby.  We predicted perceivers’ difference score measure of 
compensatory commitment post-baby from perceivers’ pre-baby compensatory commitment, 
linear and quadratic effects of perceivers’ pre-baby satisfaction, linear and quadratic effects of 
perceivers’ expectancy violation residuals, and all possible interaction terms between the linear 
and quadratic perceivers’ satisfaction and linear and quadratic perceivers’ expectancy residual 
terms.  We also included correlations among the exogenous variables, and the covariance 
between the error terms for men and women’s compensatory commitment at Time 2.   
 Table 12 lists the corresponding variables and coefficients predicting changes in the 
difference score measure of compensatory commitment.  The subscripts M and W attached to 
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specific coefficients denote occasions where the deviance test revealed a significant difference in 
the coefficient for men versus women.  Table 12 reveals that the interaction between satisfaction 
(squared) and expectancy violation (squared) predicting changes in compensatory commitment 
was significant for women, but not men, 2 (1) = 12.4, p = .005.  However, the SEM models 
predicting the component indices of commitment (Table 13) and trust (Table 14) revealed 
significant but opposite interactions between the satisfaction (squared) and expectancy violation 
(squared) interactions predicting changes in commitment and trust for both women and men.
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As we see next, the difference score masked the effects of expectancy violation for men because 
counter-cultural expectancy violations had the same effect on commitment and trust for men 
(making the difference score insensitive to change), but a more pronounced effect on 
commitment than trust for women (making the difference score sensitive to change). We 
decompose the interactions for commitment and trust before returning to the difference score. 
Figures 9 and 10 present changes in commitment and Figures 11 and 12 present changes 
in trust for men and women, respectively.  Each plots the quadratic association between pre-baby 
satisfaction and changes in the outcome as a function of the pre-baby over- vs. under-estimate of 
post-baby responsibility, plotted at 1.5 and 2 SD above/below the mean on the expectancy 
violation residual.  In decomposing these interactions, we first examined the simple effect of 
expectancy violation (squared) predicting changes in each outcome for participants 2.0 and 1.5 
SD below the mean on pre-baby satisfaction and 1.0 SD above the mean on pre-baby satisfaction.  
The simple effects of expectancy violation (squared) revealed whether less satisfied participants 
evidenced greater commitment when gendered expectations about how the post-baby world 
works were challenged as opposed to affirmed, as the model anticipates.  Second, we examined 
the simple quadratic effects of pre-baby satisfaction predicting changes in commitment and 
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changes in trust for expectancy violations involving more or less severe under-estimates (2 
SD/1.5 SD below the mean for the expectancy violation residual) and more or less severe over-
estimates of post-baby responsibility (2.0 SD/1.5 SD above the mean for the expectancy 
violation residual).  The simple effects of satisfaction (squared) revealed whether expectancy 
violations that challenge rather than affirm gendered assumptions about how the post-baby world 
works attenuated Time 1 differences in commitment between more and less satisfied people. 
Commitment.   Less satisfied fathers (Figure 9) reported relatively greater increases in 
commitment when they experienced expectancy violations that challenged rather than affirmed 
gendered expectations about how the post-baby world works.  That is, less satisfied fathers 
reported relatively greater increases in commitment when they under-estimated than over-
estimated post-baby responsibilities.  This compensatory tendency intensified as the magnitude 
of the challenge to gendered post-baby world expectations increased.  The simple effect of 
expectancy violation (squared) predicting changes in commitment was significant and positive 
(i.e., generally∪-shaped) for men 2 SD below, standardized b = .79, z = 3.19, p = .001, and 1.5 
SD below the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = .44, z = 2.73, p = .006.  The simple effect of 
expectancy violation (squared) predicting changes in commitment was not significant for men 1 
SD above the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = -.004, z =   -.05, p = .96.   
Expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the world works 
also advantaged less satisfied over more satisfied men.  When men under-estimated 
responsibility, the challenging violation, those who were less satisfied initially reported greater 
relative increases in commitment than those who were more satisfied.  Being lower in 
satisfaction also intensified this effect, captured by the curve steepening.  The simple effect of 
satisfaction (squared) was significant and positive, predicting changes in commitment for men 2 
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SD below the mean, standardized b = 1.23, z = 2.06, p = .039, and 1.5 SD below the mean on the 
expectancy violation residual, standardized b = .73, z = 1.99, p = .047.  But, when men over-
estimated responsibility, the affirming expectancy violation, the simple effect of satisfaction 
(squared) was not significant, 2 SD above, standardized b = .13, z = 0.68, p = .50, or 1.5 SD 
above the mean on the expectancy violation residual, standardized b = -.10, z = -0.60, p = .55.   
Less satisfied mothers (Figure 10) reported relatively more stable commitment when they 
experienced expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the post-
baby world works.  That is, less satisfied mothers reported relatively greater commitment when 
they over-estimated than under-estimated post-baby responsibilities.  The simple effect of 
expectancy violation (squared) predicting commitment was significant and negative (i.e., 
generally ∩-shaped) for women 2 SD below, standardized b = -.68, z = -5.21, p < .0001, and 1.5 
SD below the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = -.27, z = -2.80, p = .005.  It was not 
significant for women 1.0 SD above the mean, standardized b = -.15, z = -1.09, p = .28. 
Expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the world works 
also attenuated Time 1 differences in commitment between more and less satisfied women. 
When women under-estimated responsibility, the affirming violation, women who were less 
satisfied reported sharper declines in commitment than women who were more satisfied.  Being 
lower in satisfaction intensified this difference, captured by the curve steepening.  This simple 
effect of satisfaction (squared) was significant and negative for women 2 SD below, standardized 
b = -2.56, z = -4.35, p < .0001, and 1.5 SD below the mean on expectancy violation, standardized 
b = -1.62, z = -3.95, p = .0001.  But, when women over-estimated responsibility, the challenging 
violation, those who were less satisfied sustained commitment almost as well as more satisfied 
women.  The simple effect of satisfaction (squared) was weaker, though significant for women 2 
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SD above the mean on expectancy violation, standardized b = -.42, z = -2.08, p = .038, but it was 
not significant for women 1.5 SD above the mean, standardized b = -.02, z = -0.13, p = .90.   
Trust.  Although trust seemed to function as a barometer of anxiety in the meta-analysis 
of the experiments, men, and to a lesser extent women, compensated and affirmed trust over time 
when parenthood violated gendered expectations about how the world works.  However, trust 
presented a stronger parallel to commitment for new fathers than it did for new mothers. 
Less satisfied fathers (Figure 11) reported relatively greater increases in trust when they 
experienced expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the post-
baby world works.  That is, less satisfied fathers reported greater relative increases in trust when 
they under-estimated than over-estimated post-baby responsibilities.  This tendency intensified 
as the magnitude of the cultural violation increased.  The simple effect of expectancy violation 
(squared) was significant and positive for men 2 SD below, standardized b = .76, z = 4.23, p 
< .0001, and 1.5 SD below the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = .50, z = 3.85, p = .0001.  
The simple effect of expectancy violation (squared) predicting changes in trust was not 
significant for men 1 SD above the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = -.06, z = -.82, p = .41.   
Expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the world works 
also advantaged less satisfied over more satisfied men.  When men under-estimated 
responsibility, the challenging violation, less satisfied men reported relatively greater increases 
in trust than more satisfied men.  Being lower in satisfaction also intensified this effect, captured 
by the curve steepening.  This simple effect of satisfaction (squared) was significant and positive 
for men, 2 SD below, standardized b = 1.30, z = 3.05, p = .002 and 1.5 SD below the mean on 
expectancy violation, standardized b = .79, z = 3.04, p = .002.   But, when men over-estimated 
responsibility, the affirming violation, the simple effect of satisfaction (squared) was not 
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significant, 2 SD above, standardized b = -.02, z = -0.10, p = .92, and 1.5 SD above the mean on 
expectancy violation, standardized b = -.20, z = -1.40, p = .16.   
Less satisfied mothers reported relatively greater increases in trust when they over-
estimated, the challenging violation, than under-estimated post-baby responsibilities, the 
affirming violation (Figure 12).  These effects were attenuated relative to the effects on 
commitment though.  The simple effect of expectancy violation (squared) was only significant 
for women 2 SD below the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = -.23, z = -2.33, p = .02.  It was 
not significant for women 1.5 SD below, standardized b = -.044, z = -.59, p = .56, or 1 SD above 
the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = .03, z = 0.27, p = .79.   
Expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the world works 
also attenuated Time 1 differences in trust between more and less satisfied women. When 
women under-estimated responsibility, the affirming violation, those who were less satisfied 
reported sharper declines in trust than those who were more satisfied.  Being lower in satisfaction 
intensified this effect, captured by the curve steepening.  The simple effect of satisfaction 
(squared) was significant and negative for women 2 SD, standardized b = -1.45, z = -3.22, p 
= .001, and 1.5 SD below the mean on expectancy violation, standardized b = -.89, z = -2.83, p 
= .0047.  But, when women over-estimated responsibility, the challenging violation, less 
satisfied women sustained trust almost as well as more satisfied women.  The simple effect of 
satisfaction (squared) was not significant for women 2 SD above, standardized b = -.06, z =  -
0.37, p = .71, and 1.5 SD above the mean on expectancy violations, standardized b = .16, z = 
1.41, p = .16.  
The compensatory-commitment difference score.  The findings for the component 
measures of commitment and trust explain the null effect for men on the difference score.  Men 
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evidenced equally strong compensatory effects on commitment and trust, making the difference 
score insensitive as a measure of compensation (because the comparable effects for commitment 
and trust cancelled each other out).  But, women evidenced stronger compensatory effects on 
commitment than trust even though they evidenced compensatory effects on both.  Consequently, 
for less satisfied women, expectancy violations that challenged gendered assumptions about how 
the world works pushed commitment psychologically apart from trust just as in the experiments, 
making the difference score a sensitive measure of compensation for women.
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Motivational Preparedness to Meet the Partner’s Needs 
The findings for changes in commitment suggest that less satisfied people do find greater 
meaning in their relationships when their pre-baby expectancies are violated in ways that 
challenge gendered assumptions about the post-baby world.  However, expressions of 
commitment are relatively cheap.  Being motivationally engaged in meeting a partner’s needs 
when it is difficult to do so affords a still more conservative test of the inherent meaning people 
experience in their relationship commitments (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). 
We indexed greater motivational preparedness to meet the partner’s needs by averaging 
two indicators that were objective and grounded in-vivo in behavioral responses to a test to 
commitment:  (1) the perceiver’s psychophysiological challenge versus threat during discussion 
of the partner’s issue and (2) the partner’s ratings of the participant’s responsiveness in the 
interaction, each transformed to a z-score.  (We isolated challenge/threat responses during the 
discussion of the partner’s issue because the partner’s desire for change in the relationship tests 
the perceiver’s willingness to accommodate).  Challenge/threat captures the perceiver’s more 
automatic or uncontrolled response to the situational necessity of meeting the partner’s needs 
(Blascovich, Mendes, & Seery, 2002; Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery, & Blascovich, 
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2005; Weisbuch, Seery, Ambadi, & Blascovich, 2009), whereas the partner’s ratings of the 
perceiver’s behavior captures the perceiver’s more deliberate or controlled responses.  We 
combined these measures into a composite to allow people to evidence motivational readiness in 
idiosyncratic ways.  Namely, Arya could evidence readiness through her physiology, Aaron’s 
reports on her behavior, or both.  In this composite index, greater motivational preparedness to 
meet the partner’s needs corresponds to the perceiver’s greater psychophysiological challenge 
while discussing the partner’s issue (i.e., higher cardiac output and lower total peripheral 
resistance) and/or the partner’s more positive ratings of the perceiver’s responsiveness.   
The logic behind formative measurement models supports the use of a composite variable 
to index motivational preparedness to meet the partner’s needs even though challenge/threat 
responses and reports on the perceiver’s responsiveness were not strongly correlated.  In 
formative measurement models, the indicators cause the construct and strong correlations among 
the indicators are not expected.  Socioeconomic status provides a good example of a formative 
index.  Any combination of high income, prestigious job, or posh residence could increase SES, 
without all measures increasing simultaneously (Diamantopoulos, Riefler & Roth, 2008; 
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000).  Motivational readiness to 
meet the partner’s needs operates similarly; any combination of greater psychophysiological 
challenge and observed responsiveness could increase readiness without both needing to increase 
simultaneously.  The composite index thus allows people to evidence motivational readiness in 
their own idiosyncratic ways while still being considered psychologically equivalent, affording a 
more sensitive test of the hypotheses (Murray, Lupien, & Seery, 2012).   
We conducted SEM analyses predicting the composite index of motivational 
preparedness that generally paralleled those for self-reported commitment.  Table 15 lists the 
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variables included in this model and their corresponding coefficients.
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  It also reveals the 
expected opposite expectancy violation (squared) by satisfaction (squared) interactions for men, 
standardized b = .40, z = 2.08, p = .037, and women, standardized b = -.41, z = -2.06, p = .040.   
Supporting the conceptual rationale for the validity of the composite index, we also found 
evidence for these interactions when we analyzed each indicator separately.
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Figure 13 presents the effects for men’s motivational preparedness to meet women’s 
needs.  These effects closely paralleled those for men’s commitment, although only the simple 
effects for expectancy violation (squared) were statistically significant.  Less satisfied fathers 
were more motivationally prepared to meet their partner’s needs when they experienced 
expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the post-baby world 
works.  That is, less satisfied fathers evidenced greater motivational preparedness when they 
under-estimated than over-estimated post-baby responsibilities.  This tendency also intensified as 
the magnitude of the challenge to gendered post-baby world expectations increased.  The simple 
effect of expectancy violation (squared) predicting preparedness was significant and positive (i.e., 
generally∪-shaped) for men 2 SD below, standardized b = 1.10, z = 3.78, p < .0001, and 1.5 SD 
below the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = .69, z = 3.27, p = .001.  The simple effect of 
expectancy violation (squared) predicting preparedness was not significant for men 1 SD above 
the mean on satisfaction, standardized b = -.11, z = -0.87, p = .38.     
Figure 14 presents the effects for women’s motivational preparedness to meet men’s 
needs.  These effects generally paralleled those for women’s commitment, although the ∩-
shaped curve was even more pronounced.  Only the simple effects for satisfaction (squared) were 
significant.  When women under-estimated responsibility, the culturally affirming violation, 
moderately satisfied women evidenced greater motivational preparedness to meet their partner’s 
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needs than less satisfied women and more satisfied women.  The simple effect of satisfaction 
(squared) was negative and significant for women 2 SD, standardized b = -1.80, z = -2.11, p 
= .035, and 1.5 SD below the mean on expectancy violation, standardized b = -1.24, z = -2.11, p 
= .035.  But, when women over-estimated responsibility, the challenging violation, they 
evidenced similar levels of motivational readiness regardless of satisfaction.  The simple effect 
of satisfaction (squared) was not significant for women 2 SD above, standardized b = -.11, z =  -
0.28, p = .78, and 1.5 SD above the mean on expectancy violations, standardized b = -.02, z = -
0.09, p = .93.  Thus, expectancy violations that challenged gendered expectations about how the 
world works attenuated satisfaction-related differences in women’s motivational preparedness to 
meet their partner’s needs in a conflict-of-interest situation.   
Discussion 
When the transition to parenthood challenged gendered expectations about how the post-
baby world works, less satisfied men and women defensively affirmed commitment.  
Nonetheless, this defensive affirmation of commitment took a different shape for new fathers 
than it did for new mothers.  For less satisfied new fathers, challenging expectancy violations 
predicted actual increases in commitment.  Less satisfied men evidenced greater actual growth in 
commitment and greater objective readiness to meet their partner’s needs when they under- than 
over-estimated their post-baby responsibilities.  However, for less satisfied new mothers, 
challenging expectancy violations predicted inhibited declines in commitment.  Less satisfied 
women evidenced more stable commitment when they over- than under-estimated post-baby 
responsibilities.  Over-estimating responsibility also appeared to attenuate differences in 
motivational readiness to meet the partner’s needs between more and less satisfied women.   
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These findings speak to the power and specificity of the commitment-defense motive.  As 
the model predicts, only expectancy violations that challenged gendered associations about how 
the post-baby world works motivated commitment-defense.  In this study, these challenging 
expectancy violations could be either positive (i.e., over-estimating responsibility) or negative 
(i.e., under-estimating) responsibility, but they nonetheless still predicted commitment defense.  
Indeed, less satisfied men who under-estimated post-baby responsibilities strengthened their 
commitments despite living with a more personally onerous violation of expectancy.   
There is a salient alternative explanation for these effects though.  Less satisfied women 
who under-estimated responsibility (an affirming violation) evidenced declines in commitment.  
Maybe less satisfied women who over-estimated their post-baby responsibilities reported more 
stable commitment because they were delighted to be carrying a lighter domestic load.  If 
domestic delight is driving the effects, men should have also evidenced greater commitment 
when they over-estimated their responsibilities.  However, men actually evidenced greater 
commitment when they under-estimated their responsibilities.  Delight over a light domestic 
burden cannot account for evidenced changes in commitment for both men and women.  Enacted 
domestic responsibilities cannot account for the contrasting effects for new mothers and fathers 
either because the expectancy violation residual is statistically independent of actual 
responsibility.  Moreover, when we substituted actual responsibility for expectancy violations in 
the SEM models predicting motivational readiness to meet the partner’s needs and changes in 
commitment and trust, we did not replicate the interactive effects for expectancy violations.   
These findings do have limitations.  We combined scales tapping commitment and 
closeness in the commitment composite and scales tapping perceptions of the partner’s 
commitment, perceptions of the partner’s closeness, disposition to be trustworthy, and trust in the 
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partner’s regard to broadly capture these constructs.  However, violating expectancies might 
have produced effects on these composites without actually changing less satisfied participants’ 
responses on the commitment and perceived commitment scales (which bear the closest 
empirical parallel to our conceptual constructs).  To see if this was the case, we redid the SEM 
analyses predicted self-reported changes in commitment and trust using only the scales tapping 
commitment and perceived commitment.  These analyses revealed opposite and significant 
expectancy violation (squared) by satisfaction (squared) interactions predicting commitment for 
both men, standardized b = .372, z = 1.97, p = .048, and women, standardized b = -1.20, z = -
7.27, p < .0001, and predicting perceptions of the partner’s commitment for both men, 
standardized b =.80, z = 4.63, p < .0001, and women, standardized b = -.39, z = -2.69, p = .007.  
Even though the findings for the full and narrow measures of commitment parallel the 
logic of the commitment-defense model, the findings for trust were more equivocal.  For women, 
over-estimating responsibility, the challenging violation, did push commitment apart from trust 
psychologically.  The nature of this separation differed from the experiments though.  In the 
experiments, people who experienced expectancy violations reported decreased trust (relative to 
controls).  But experiencing such a violation with new motherhood did not actively decrease trust.  
It simply suppressed its affirmation relative to commitment over time (as evidenced by the 
weaker effects on trust than commitment for new mothers).  But for men, under-estimating 
responsibility did not push commitment apart from trust at all.  Men instead compensated and 
affirmed both trust and commitment.  We explore explanations for these differences when we 
return to trust’s role in motivating commitment-defense in the General Discussion. 
General Discussion 
 When events in the world at large confound expectations, relationships provide a 
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potential resource for restoring meaning.  In the commitment-defense model, violating 
expectations about the world outside the relationship motivates people who most need to set their 
relationship right to affirm and defend their commitment.  The present findings offer promising 
initial support for the model and elucidate directions for model refinement and future research. 
Setting Disorderly Worlds Right Through Relationships  
 The experiments violated expectations about the world outside the relationship by telling 
the tale of hard work come to naught, depicting unconventional sitcom plots and surrealist 
images, and compelling people to avoid positive and approach negative stimuli.  For people in 
less satisfying relationships, experiencing such expectancy violations pushed commitment 
psychologically apart from trust.  Meta-analyzing the experiments revealed robust interactions 
between expectancy violation condition and satisfaction (squared) predicting the compensatory-
commitment difference score and its components.  The lower people’s satisfaction in their 
relationships, the greater the power expectancy violations had to provoke stronger compensatory 
expressions of commitment.  Indeed, expectancy violations motivated less satisfied people to risk 
affirming commitments that were just as strong as those voiced by the most satisfied participants. 
 Becoming a parent can similarly violate consensual gendered expectations for how the 
world works.  When women expected to do more and men expected to do less than the post-baby 
world delivered, less satisfied new mothers and fathers seemed to compensate and defensively 
affirm commitment.  However, the nature of this defensive affirmation differed for new mothers 
and fathers.  Over-estimating responsibility appeared to inhibit commitment’s decline for less 
satisfied new mothers.  That is, less satisfied women who over-estimated responsibilities, the 
challenging violation, evidenced more stable commitment than less satisfied women who under-
estimated responsibilities, the affirming violation.  They also evidenced as much motivational 
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readiness to meet their partner’s needs in the conflict interaction as more satisfied women, a 
signature marker of commitment.  However, under-estimating responsibility appeared to 
promote growth in commitment for less satisfied new fathers.  That is, less satisfied men who 
under-estimated responsibilities, the challenging violation, evidenced greater increases in 
commitment pre-to-post baby than less satisfied men who over-estimated responsibilities, the 
affirming violation.  Less satisfied men who under-estimated their responsibilities also evidenced 
significantly greater motivational preparedness to meet their partner’s needs relative to men who 
over-estimated responsibilities. Post-baby divisions of labor that violated personal and cultural 
expectations thus protected the most vulnerable of new parents against the declines in 
experienced and expressed commitment that can come with new parenthood. 
The experimental, survey, and longitudinal studies together elucidate basic tenets of the 
commitment-defense model.  First, people who are less satisfied in their relationships seem to 
exist in more chronically incongruent psychological states because their attitude toward their 
relationship contradicts their behavior within it (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).  Living in such a 
dissonant state makes the relationship a more pressing psychological canvas for imposing 
expected associations on the world because the relationship itself is in a state of disorder that 
needs to be remedied.  In the follow-up surveys, less satisfied people did indeed express greater 
desire to change their relationship attitudes, purportedly because questioning the meaning of 
their lives turned their relationship into a disquieting source of dissonance and disorder.  
Therefore, when experiences threatened expected orderly associations in the world at large, less 
satisfied people needed to set their relationship commitments right to restore some sense of order 
to the world.  Expectancy violations instead lost the potential to motivate commitment defense as 
satisfaction approached its average and the relationship itself was already in an ordered state.   
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Second, in the commitment-defense model, trust functions as a barometer of uncertainty, 
whereas commitment functions as a barometer of meaning and purpose.  Consequently, 
expectancy violations should push commitment psychologically apart from trust because trust 
exists specifically to capture and resonate sources of uncertainty, such as the anxiety caused by 
expectancy violations.  The five experiments yielded solid evidence for this hypothesized 
separation; the expectancy violation by satisfaction (squared) interactions for commitment and 
trust were opposite in shape and differed significantly in direction (see Footnote 6).  Nonetheless, 
the effects for trust were more variable than those for commitment across the experiments (even 
though the meta-analytic fixed effects estimates were significant for both measures).   
The transition to parenthood study further suggests that trust may not always function to 
resonate the anxiety provoked by expectancy violations in exactly same way.  In the experiments, 
less satisfied participants tended to report less trust in the expectancy violation than control 
conditions, a difference that intensified with lower satisfaction.  However, trust did not resonate 
anxiety as clearly for new parents who encountered divisions of labor that challenged gendered 
expectations about how the post-baby world works.  While over-estimating post-baby 
responsibilities pushed commitment psychologically apart from trust for women, these new 
mothers nonetheless evidenced relative stability, not declines in trust.  Moreover, men who 
under-estimated post-baby responsibilities actually evidenced relative increases in trust.  The 
most plausible, though post-hoc, explanation for the variability in the findings for trust might rest 
in the nature of the expectancy violation itself.  For instance, in the transition to parenthood study, 
the partner was complicit in the expectancy violations.  Consequently, this complicity might 
have activated a competing relationship-specific motivation not to question the partner’s caring 
(Murray & Holmes, 2009).  If this happened, it would make explicit reports of trust a less 
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sensitive reflection of the anxiety provoked by expectancy violations in the world outside the 
relationship.  The findings thus raise the possibility that that trust might play a more nuanced role 
in resonating anxiety than the model anticipated.  Namely, trust might resonate anxiety directly 
through its decline or indirectly through its inhibited affirmation relative to commitment. 
In Defense of the Model:  Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 The present studies contain strengths and limitations.  On the upside, we found 
convergent support for the hypotheses with established experimental procedures for violating 
expected associations, with a new behavioral violation of expectations, and with naturally-
occurring expectancy violations that occurred over the transition to parenthood.  We also found 
convergent support for the hypotheses across MTurk samples, introductory psychology students, 
and expectant parents.  Also on the plus side, we used meta-analysis to limit interpretation to 
only those effects that proved most robust in the experiments. 
On the downside, aspects of the data and theorizing are less than perfect.  On the data 
side, the interaction between expectancy violation condition and satisfaction (squared) predicting 
the composite difference score measure of compensatory commitment was not significant in 
every experiment.  In Experiment 2, the predicted interaction only emerged for people who 
completed dissonance questions prior to the dependent measures (see Footnote 7); in Experiment 
5, it was only significant for people high in self-esteem; in Experiment 3, it was not significant, 
period.  However, in every experiment, this interaction was in the predicted direction and it 
served to strengthen the meta-analytic effect.  Indeed, findings that fall short of conventional 
significance can nonetheless testify to the robustness of an effect just as they did here (Fabrigar 
& Wegner, 2016).  Moreover, when we limited our analyses to the actual measures of 
commitment and perceived commitment most central to our theoretical analysis, the predicted 
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interaction effects for the individual experiments were even more robust (see Footnote 13).   
On the theoretical side, the model posits that less satisfying relationships offer a better 
canvas for affirming order in the world because there is more for dissatisfied perceivers to set 
right in their relationships when expectancy violations impose disorder on the world.  The 
findings from the survey studies lend support to this reasoning, but these correlational data 
cannot prove that less satisfied people are more susceptible to expectancy violations because 
they actually want their relationship commitments to make more sense.  The model is also 
relatively mute on how highly satisfied perceivers counter expectancy violations in the world 
outside the relationship.  Simply thinking of the relationship should be enough to set the world 
right for more satisfied perceivers, but the current experiments did not directly test this 
proposition.  Future research might examine whether priming a relationship partner is more 
likely to function as a ready-made palliative defense against expectancy violations for people 
who are already highly satisfied in their relationships.  
The model also implicitly assumes that trust resonates anxiety to motivate commitment 
defense.  The meta-analytic findings for the compensatory-commitment difference score support 
this possibility, but the experiments did not test it directly.  Future research might employ 
implicit measures of trust to better understand its role in resonating anxiety and motivating 
commitment defense.  Nonetheless, the experiments provide initial evidence that meaning 
violations can sometimes provoke measurable relationship anxiety on an explicit measure.  Such 
direct evidence of the activation of anxiety is typically absent in meaning threat experiments 
(Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012).  The model also assumes that affirming commitment to the 
relationship restores meaning to the world, but the studies did not make this point directly.  
Instead, consistent with research on meaning maintenance (Heine et al., 2006), we assumed that 
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meaning is restored through the affirmation of an expected association in the world – being in a 
fulfilling relationship.  Future research should provide more direct evidence for this assumption. 
Further theoretical refinement of the model’s boundary conditions is also needed.  The 
parenthood study suggests that expectancy violations need to challenge expected associations in 
the world to precipitate commitment defense.  But, the present research did not pinpoint exactly 
how long compensatory bolstering of commitment might last, nor did it distinguish the effects of 
the expectancy violation itself from the attendant consequences of the expectancy violation on 
commitment.  Although parenthood provides a ripe naturalistic context for violating cultural 
expectations about how the world works, its attendant stressors, such as sleep deprivation and 
lost leisure time, likely motivate their own justification.  Indeed, parents typically justify the 
costs of parenting by idealizing the state of parenting itself (Eibach & Mock, 2011).  Thus, the 
pressure to justify one’s actions that parenthood creates might help sustain commitment defense 
over time.  However, the stressors attendant to other types of expectancy violations could impose 
less readily rationalized sources of stress on the relationship.  In the current model, becoming ill 
despite exemplary health habits or losing a job despite excellent performance reviews should 
elicit immediate inclinations to compensate and bolster commitment as a means of restoring 
meaning to the world.  But, losing a job or suffering ill health imposes uncontrollable attendant 
stressors and complications on the relationship (e.g., loss of income) that could undo such 
compensatory bolstering of commitment over time.  Future research should try to examine how 
the experience of such attendant stressors affect people’s capacity to restore meaning and order 
to their lives through their relationships.  For instance, it might be the case that expectancy 
violations that impose high levels of stress elicit an immediate motivation to affirm commitment 
that becomes more difficult to fulfill over time as attendant stressors erode the self-regulatory 
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resources needed to act on motivations to strengthen commitment (Neff & Karney, 2009).  
Expectancy violations that instead elicit moderate levels of stress might be more likely to elicit 
sustained commitment by strengthening the self-regulatory capacity to act on motivations to 
defend commitment.  Indeed, experience coping with modest levels of stress functions as a kind 
of inoculation that allows people to better cope with future unexpectedly stressful events, both 
inside and outside the relationship (Neff & Broady, 2011; Seery, Holman, & Silver, 2010; Seery 
& Quinton, 2016).  Further refinements of the theoretical model might also specify when people 
are likely to restore order to the world through the relationship as opposed to affirming alternate 
sources of order, such as the moral turpitude of prostitutes or the value of national allegiance.  
Perhaps people are more likely to affirm sources of meaning outside the relationship when their 
personality makes it difficult for them to see relationships as inherently valuable and meaningful.  
In the current research, we explored the possibility that low self-esteem people might be less 
likely to affirm meaning through their relationship than highs because lows are cautious and 
avoidant in relationships, afraid to let their relationships mean too much to them (Murray, 
Holmes, & Griffin, 2000).  The meta-analysis of the experiments yielded tentative support for 
this exploratory hypothesis.  Less satisfied perceivers who were also low in self-esteem 
evidenced the weakest, though still evident, tendencies to defensively affirm commitment in the 
face of expectancy violations (relative to controls).  Thus, there could be value in exploring 
personality dispositions that make relationships a more viable resource for restoring meaning.   
Despite these weaknesses, the present findings suggest potential interconnections 
between self and relationship regulatory systems.  In the transactive goal system model, people 
pursue self-regulatory goals within goal systems defined by the partner and relationship 
(Fitzsimons, Finkel, & van Dellen, 2015).  Consequently, the pursuit of relationship goals can 
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co-opt more basic self-regulatory systems.  For instance, pursuing the relationship-specific goal 
to self-protect against a partner’s harsh words activates the more general goal to avoid harm, 
including risky bets (Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Holmes, 2010).  The present findings suggest that 
pursuing self-regulatory goals can similarly co-opt basic relationship-regulatory goals.  When 
circumstances threatened the goal to perceive an expected world, the very people who normally 
self-protectively regulate risk in relationships instead sought to affirm the value and meaning in 
their commitment to their partner to try to make the world meaningful once again. 
Conclusion 
 Life does not always unfold as people expect, nor do relationships.  But when life does 
not unfold as people expect, they can at least turn to their relationship to make life make sense 
again.  Less satisfied people affirmed the inherent value of their relationship commitments to 
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  We made the a priori decision to exclude this small number of maximally dissatisfied 
participants for two reasons. First, relative to other participants who were at least somewhat 
satisfied with their relationship, they seemed unlikely to have the same motivation to maintain 
their relationship at all, thus placing them in a meaningfully different population than the rest of 
our participants. Second, extreme outliers can be unduly influential in any analyses, but this is 
magnified when testing curvilinear relationships as we do here. Unlike less extreme observations, 
those distant from the mean (> 3 SDs below) (a) can distort and/or obscure the curve that would 
otherwise fit the rest of sample and (b) are sparsely represented (< 1% of the total N), which 
means there is only a small and thus unreliable amount of data behind their influence. This can 
yield unstable findings at outlying values (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These 
conceptual and statistical reasons leave data from maximally dissatisfied participants 
uninterpretable in terms of our research question. 
2
  We set 200 participants as the minimum sample size for Experiment 1 anticipating that either 
satisfaction or self-esteem might moderate the main effect of condition, satisfying the 
recommendations of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) for a minimum sample size of 20 
participants per cell.  Because Experiment 1 revealed a significant interaction between 
expectancy violation condition and satisfaction (squared) predicting compensatory commitment, 
we based subsequent sample sizes on the effect size for this interaction term (Cohen’s f2 = .04).  
A power analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lange, 2009) suggested 




with this effect size.  The sample sizes we obtained in Experiments 2-4 typically exceed these 
benchmarks.   
3
 For exploratory purposes, we included a 3-item measure of dissonance (i.e., “uncomfortable”, 
“uneasy”, “bothered”, Elliot & Devine, 1994) in Experiments 2 and 3.  In Experiment 2, we 
manipulated the order of administration of this dissonance measure; it preceded the dependent 
measures for half of the participants and followed the dependent measures for the other half of 
the participants.  In Experiment 3, the dissonance measure followed the dependent measures for 
all participants.  
4
 The two exploratory measures asked participants to make predictions for their own and their 
partner’s shared sentiments.  Participants rated their willingness to engage in 12 specific 
interdependence-increasing activities (e.g., I would be willing to ask my partner to…“Distract 
me from my worries when I feel under stress”, “help me solve my personal problems”, “plan our 
activities together”) and participants also made 12 predictions for future joint behavior (e.g., “My 
partner or I will be attracted enough to another person to consider leaving the relationship”; “My 
partner and I always enjoying each other’s company no matter how much time we spend 
together”).  As these measures conflated trusting and committed sentiments, we do not discuss 
them further.  The measure of mood had inexplicably poor reliability and is not discussed further. 
5
  We averaged the coefficient alpha for each experiment to provide a reliability estimate for the 
scales included across all five experiments. 
6
  In the repeated measures ANCOVA, the meta-analytic expectancy violation condition by 
satisfaction (squared) by relationship sentiment (i.e., commitment vs. trust composite) interaction 





  In Experiment 2, we obtained a significant order of dissonance questions by expectancy 
violation condition by satisfaction-squared interaction.  Decomposing this interaction revealed 
that the interaction between the satisfaction (squared) and expectancy violation condition was 
significant when the dissonance questions preceded the dependent measures,  = .31, t(380) = 
2.24, p = .026.  Thus, making feelings of uncertainty more salient appeared to potentiate the 
predicted effects.  To be conservative, we included the results for the unconditional expectancy 
violation condition by satisfaction (squared) interaction in the meta-analysis. 
8
  The “Inclusion of Other in the Self” scale conflates the participant’s feelings of closeness to 
the partner with the partner’s feelings of closeness to the participant because the overlapping self 
and partner circles capture dyadic cohesiveness (Aron et al., 2002).  Because this scale requires 
simultaneous expressions of commitment and trust, we could not include this measure in either 
the commitment or the trust composite (or the difference score index of compensatory 
commitment).  Meta-analyzing this measure across experiments yielded a non-significant 
expectancy violation condition by satisfaction squared interaction, r = -.009, 95% CI [-
.057, .038], z = -0.39, p = .70, and a non-significant expectancy violation condition by 
satisfaction squared by self-esteem interaction, r = -.016, 95% CI [-.063, .032], z = -0.65, p = .52.     
9
  When we omitted self-esteem and its interactive effects from the regression analyses, the meta-
analytic expectancy violation by satisfaction (squared) interaction predicting compensatory 
commitment was still significant, r = .052, 95% CI [.005, .099], z = 2.16, p = .031. 
10
 For the difference score index of compensatory-commitment, self-esteem further moderated 
the effects of satisfaction.  The meta-analytic interaction between expectancy violation condition, 




analytically, we estimated the expectancy violation by satisfaction-squared interaction predicting 
compensatory commitment affirmation within each experiment for participants one standard 
deviation below and above the mean on self-esteem.  Meta-analyzing the conditional interactions 
revealed that expectancy violations tended to provoke commitment affirmation for less satisfied 
people who were low on self-esteem, r = .038, 95% CI [-.009, .085], z = 1.57, p = .12, but more 
strongly provoked commitment affirmation for less satisfied people at the midpoint on self-
esteem, r = .103, 95% CI [.056, .149], z = 4.29, p < .0001, and less satisfied people who were 
high on self-esteem, r = .102, 95% CI [.055, .149 ], z = 4.26, p < .0001.   
11
  Unlike the fixed effects estimates for trust, the random effects estimate for the interaction 
between satisfaction (squared) and expectancy violation condition only approached significance, 
r = -.057, 95% CI [-.130, .016], z = -1.53, p = .13.  The simple effects of expectancy violation 
condition at 2 SD, r = -.101, 95% CI [-.220, .020], z = -1.64, p = .10 and 1.5 SD below the mean 
on satisfaction, r = -.089, 95% CI [-.202, .027], z = -1.50, p = .13, were also slightly weaker.  
12
  The main effect of expectancy violation condition predicting the manipulation check was 
significant in Experiment 1,  = .78, t(196) = 12.15, p < .0001, Experiment 2,  = .87, t(380) = 
24.24, p < .0001, Experiment 3,  = .36, t(395) = 5.84, p < .0001, Experiment 4,  = .32, t(489) = 
6.03, p < .0001, and moderated by satisfaction (squared) in Experiment 5,  = .25, t(202) = 1.91, 
p = .058.  In Experiment 5, the predicted main effect of expectancy violation condition predicting 
the manipulation check only tended to be evident for participants one standard deviation above 
the mean on satisfaction,  = .20, t(202) = 1.62, p = .11.  Despite the null main effect for 
condition in Experiment 5, it is still reasonable to believe that approaching negative and avoiding 




through 4.  Dependent measures provide better evidence for the intended effect of experimental 
manipulations than manipulation checks especially in situations where people might not be able 
to articulate the exact psychological state they are experiencing (Sigall & Mills, 1998).  Finding 
consistent effects on the dependent measures across studies thus suggests we induced 
conceptually similar expectancy violations.  Nonetheless, the condition by satisfaction (squared) 
interaction predicting the difference score index of compensatory commitment was still 
significant when we omitted Experiment 5 from the meta-analysis, r = .085, 95% CI[.035, .135], 
z = 3.33, p = .001. 
13
  The expectancy violation by satisfaction (squared) interaction predicting the difference 
between commitment and perceived commitment was significant and positive in Study 1, b = .41, 
t = 2.90, p = .004, moderated by the order of the dissonance questions in Study 2, b = -0.16, t =   
-1.87, p = .06, significant and positive in Study 3, b = .17, t = 2.26, p = .024, significant and 
positive in Study 4, b = .17, t = 2.65, p = .008, and marginally significant and positive in Study 5, 
b = .22, t = 1.76, p = .079. 
14
  We also included a further set of SEM models that included the quadratic effect of satisfaction 
(i.e., satisfaction squared) as a simultaneous predictor.  The indirect effect of satisfaction (linear) 
continued to be significant in both samples, but the indirect effect of satisfaction (squared) was 
not significant in either sample.  Thus, the observed indirect effect of satisfaction on desired 
change in relationship attitudes was equally pronounced across levels of satisfaction. 
15
  This prediction assumes that couples possess the minimal level of psychological resources 
needed to enact heightened motivations to strengthen commitment.  In some circumstances, the 




job loss, may compromise such resources over time and undercut couple’s capacity to strengthen 
their commitment.  We return to this point in the General Discussion.  
16
 Increases in HR and VC reflect engagement in the situation and they are common across the 
challenge/threat continuum.  These four cardiovascular markers have been validated and applied 
in dozens of studies (for reviews, see Blascovich, 2008; Seery, 2013).   
17
  The 3-item perceptions of the partner’s commitment measure included 1 further item not 
administered in the 2-item measure used in the experiments.  
18
  Participants also completed a 14-day on-line diary assessment after the Time 1 and Time 2 
laboratory sessions.  We designed the transition to parenthood study to answer a myriad of 
questions, the majority of which are not relevant to the current project.  Because we utilized only 
those scales described in the measures section in testing the study hypotheses, we do not discuss 
the other measures or procedures in depth. 
19
  We could not include relationship centrality in the commitment composite (as in Experiments 
1-5) or perceptions of the partner’s responsive behavior in the trust composite (as in Experiment 
5) because we did not have the foresight to include these measures.  We had not designed any of 
the expectancy-violation experiments at the time we started data collection for the parenthood 
study.  Nevertheless, the measures we had put in place in the parenthood study ended up 
affording an excellent opportunity to conduct a naturalistic replication of the experiments. 
20
  Fitting the model predicting changes in trust necessitated adding two partner effects:  (1) the 
effects of the partner’s Time 1 satisfaction predicting the perceiver’s Time 2 trust and (2) the 
effects of the partner’s Time 1 trust on the perceiver’s Time 2 trust.  The model was a very poor 




the expectancy (squared) by satisfaction (squared) interaction predicting trust was still significant 
for women, standardized b = -.39, z = -2.87, p = .004 and marginally significant for men, 
standardized b = .23, z = 1.68, p = .092, when we omitted these partner effects from the model.  
Thus, including the partner effects did not produce the interactions; it only improved the fit of 
the model, helping to ensure that the interaction effects were indeed properly evaluated in the 
context of the overall model.  
21
  Given the added complexity to the analytic model introduced with dyadic data, we did not 
include self-esteem in the primary analyses.  However, we did utilize the mixed model procedure 
within SPSS to test whether self-esteem moderated the obtained interactions.  That is, we 
examined whether self-esteem further moderated the interaction between gender and the effects 
of satisfaction (squared) and expectancy violation (squared) in predicting changes in the 
difference score index of compensatory commitment and its components.  No significant 
interactions between self-esteem and the gender by satisfaction (squared) by expectancy 
violation (squared) emerged, regardless of whether we examined the compensatory-commitment 
difference score, F (1, 227.31) = 1.63, p =.20, commitment, F (1, 235.64) = .092, p =.76, or trust, 
F (1, 236.41) = 2.87, p =.09.  (We could not use AMOS to estimate this model because it proved 
impossible to draw all of the necessary co-variances among exogenous variables in the graphics 
interface.) 
22
  We included paths capturing the association between the partner’s satisfaction and the 
perceiver’s motivational readiness because the model was a poor fit to the data without these 
paths, 2(22) = 38.8, p = .015, RMSEA = .06.  Nonetheless, the expectancy (squared) by 




= .48, z = 2.41, p = .016 and marginally significant for women, standardized b = -.38, z = -1.79, p 
= .07, when we omitted these partner effects from the model.  Thus, including the partner effects 
did not produce the interactions; it only improved the fit of the model, helping to ensure that the 
interaction effects were indeed properly evaluated in the context of the overall model.  
23
   The SEM model predicting the perceiver’s challenge/threat responses paralleled the model 
predicting self-reported changes in commitment.  In this model, the expectancy violation 
(squared) by satisfaction (squared) interaction was significant and negative for women, 
standardized b = -.61, z = -2.47, p = .014, and approaching significance and positive for men, 
standardized b = .32, z = 1.51, p = .13.  The SEM model predicting the partner’s perception of 
the perceiver’s responsiveness included all possible actor and partner effects (as the hypothesized 
effect involves a partner effect).  In this model, the expectancy violation (squared) by satisfaction 
(squared) interaction was significant and positive for men, standardized b = .42, z = 2.27, p 
= .023, and negative, but not significant, for women, b = -.20, z = -0.95, p = .34.  Decomposing 
the interactions for the individual measures revealed patterns of simple effects generally similar 
to those for the composite, although simple effects that were statistically significant for the 
composite reached significance only for the perceiver’s challenge/threat responses. 
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Table 1. Aggregate Descriptive Information for the Experiments 
    Mean SD Min Max 
Self-Esteem   5.52 1.12 1.84 7 
Satisfaction   6.00 1.07 2 7 
Own Closeness   7.34 1.66 1.52 9 
Perceptions of Partner Closeness   7.41 1.66 1.4 9 
Own Commitment   8.09 1.48 1.67 9 
Perceptions of Partner Commitment   8.17 1.36 2 9 
Relationship Centrality   5.7 0.97 1.85 7 
Trust in Partner's Regard*   6.02 0.89 2.53 7 
Dispositional Trustworthiness*   6.91 1.08 3.21 8.89 
Predictions of Partner's Trustworthy Behavior*   5.27 0.86 2.44 7 




















Predictor  t  t  t 
Self-esteem -.41 -4.82*** -.20 -3.04** .15 2.26* 
Satisfaction .05 0.54 .59 8.30*** .50 6.96*** 
Condition  .03 0.39 .13 2.04* .10 1.45 
Satisfaction squared -.07 -0.54 .03 0.28 .08 0.82 
Self-esteem X condition .12 1.42 .09 1.35 -.02 -0.25 
Self-esteem X satisfaction .58 4.14*** .32 2.97** -.18 -1.61 
Satisfaction X condition -.20 -2.19* .02 .22 .18 2.47* 
Esteem X satisfaction squared 0.84 4.27*** .67 4.42*** -.07 -0.44 
Condition X satisfaction 
squared 
.43 2.97** -.06 -0.50 -.40 -3.54*** 
Esteem X satisfaction X 
condition 
-.38 -2.54* -.32 -2.78** .01 0.12 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
.29 1.47 -.22 -1.41 -.44 -2.81** 
 
a
 df error (204) 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Predictor  t  t  t 
Self-esteem -.17 -0.93 -.01 -0.10 .10 0.67 
Satisfaction .02 0.25 .60 12.57*** .58 12.17*** 
Condition  -.04 -0.64 -.02 -0.38 .01 0.16 
Order -.04 -0.56 -.01 -0.13 .02 0.33 
Satisfaction squared -.08 -1.12 -.17 -3.17** -.12 -2.20* 
Condition X order .11 1.70
+
 -.03 -0.61 -.11 -2.00* 
Self-esteem X condition .06 0.29 .07 0.42 .03 0.18 
Self-esteem X order .03 .38 .02 0.34 .00 0.02 
Self-esteem X satisfaction -.04 -0.66 .10 1.95
+
 .12 2.46* 
Satisfaction X condition .05 0.88 .01 0.29 -.02 -0.43 
Satisfied X order .03 0.43 .00 0.01 -.02 -0.34 
Esteem X satisfaction squared .13 1.44 -.04 -0.59 -.13 -1.76
+
 
Condition X satisfaction 
squared 
.11 1.32 .06 0.85 -.02 -0.25 
Esteem X satisfaction X 
condition 
.01 0.20 .07 1.26 .06 1.08 
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Esteem X satisfaction X order -.11 -1.73
+
 -.01 -0.19 .06 1.23 
Esteem X threat X order -.04 -0.50 -.06 -1.03 -.03 -0.61 
Satisfied X threat X order -.04 -0.69 .01 0.20 .04 0.77 
Order X satisfaction squared .19 2.29* .14 2.12* .01 0.21 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
.03 0.29 -.03 -0.39 -.04 -0.62 




 .07 1.42 -.01 -0.22 
Condition X order X 
satisfaction squared 
-.20 -2.37* .04 0.60 .17 2.54* 
Esteem X order X satisfaction 
squared 
-.13 -1.39 -.08 -1.14 .00 0.03 
Esteem X condition X order X 
satisfaction squared 
-.07 -0.72 .05 0.76 .10 1.34 
 
a
 df error (380) 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Predictor  t  t  t 
Self-esteem -.14 -2.12* .07 1.58 .15 3.35** 
Satisfaction -.02 -0.24 .66 14.02*** .66 13.88*** 
Condition  -.00 -0.54 -.02 -0.52 -.02 -0.47 
Satisfaction squared -.21 -3.10** -.08 -1.67
+
 .05 1.03 
Self-esteem X condition -.00 -0.03 -.10 -2.20* -.10 -2.12* 
Self-esteem X satisfaction .15 2.36* .00 0.04 -.09 -1.98* 
Satisfaction X condition -.03 -0.37 .04 0.86 .06 1.15 
Esteem X satisfaction squared -.01 -0.17 .03 0.59 .04 0.72 
Condition X satisfaction squared .09 1.13 .05 0.91 -.01 -0.09 
Esteem X satisfaction X 
condition 
.04 0.52 .04 0.75 .01 0.29 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
-.01 -0.15 .04 0.75 .05 0.86 
 
a
 df error (395) 
+






















Predictor  t  t  t 
Self-esteem -.26 -4.99*** -.01 -0.22 .19 4.15*** 
Satisfaction .06 1.05 .64 14.95*** .58 12.8*** 
Condition  -.08 -1.52 -.03 -0.66 .03 0.72 
Satisfaction squared -.18 -3.16** -.09 -1.88 .05 1.03 
Self-esteem X condition -.10 -1.90
+
 -.10 -2.35* -.02 -0.50 
Self-esteem X satisfaction .23 3.80*** .11 2.29* -.06 -1.21 
Satisfaction X condition .01 0.17 -.05 -1.10 -.05 -1.16 
Esteem X satisfaction squared .00 0.04 -.08 -1.42 -.08 -1.34 
Condition X satisfaction squared .12 1.87
+
 .06 1.05 -.04 -0.67 
Esteem X satisfaction X 
condition 
.01 0.13 .08 1.68
+
 .07 1.43 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
.23 3.20** .19 3.32** .02 0.26 
 
a
 df error (489) 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Predictor  t  t  t 
Self-esteem -.01 -0.10 .07 0.70 .09 0.86 
Satisfaction -.17 -1.21 .63 5.95*** .79 7.66*** 
Condition  -.06 -0.75 -.12 -1.90
+
 -.08 -1.29 
Satisfaction squared -.44 -3.25** -.06 -0.57 .26 2.67** 
Self-esteem X condition -.23 -1.55 -.24 -2.15* -.08 -0.77 
Self-esteem X satisfaction -.11 -0.66 -.06 -0.52 .01 0.11 
Satisfaction X condition .08 0.61 .11 1.14 .06 0.61 
Esteem X satisfaction squared .09 0.51 .02 0.16 -.04 -0.34 
Condition X satisfaction squared .39 3.10** .21 2.26* -.06 -0.69 
Esteem X satisfaction X 
condition 
.06 0.37 .13 1.15 .10 0.86 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
.16 0.94 .23 1.83
+
 .13 1.04 
 
a
 df error (202) 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 7.  The Meta-Analytic Estimates for the Experiments 
  
Compensatory- 









Predictor r 95% CI z r 95% CI z r 95% CI z 
Self-esteem -.139 -.185, -.093 -5.82*** -.005 -.052, .042 -0.22 .125 .079, .172 5.24*** 
Satisfaction .008 -.039, .055 0.33 .527 .492, .560 24.33*** .508 .472, .542 23.26*** 
Condition  -.031 -.078, .016 -1.28 -.018 -.065, .030 -0.73 .007 -.040, .054 0.29 
Satisfaction squared -.12 -.167, -.074 -5.03*** -.082 -.129, -.035 -3.43*** .029 -.018, .076 1.20 
Self-esteem X condition -.023 -.070, .025 -0.94 -.057 -.104, -.010 -2.39* -.037 -.084, .010 -1.56 
Self-esteem X satisfaction .097 .050, .144 4.05*** .073 .026, .120 3.03** -.023 -.070, .024 -0.95 
Satisfaction X condition -.005 -.052, .042 -0.21 .010 -.037, .058 0.44 .019 -.028, .066 0.80 




Table 7 continued. 
  
Compensatory- 







Predictor r 95% CI z r 95% CI z r 95% CI z 




.056, .149 4.29*** .049 .001, .095 2.02* -.048 -.095, -.001 -1.99* 




-.055, .039 -0.33 .031 -.016, .078 1.30 .042 -.005, .089 1.76
+
 
Esteem X condition X 
satisfaction squared 
.063 .016, .110 2.62** .050 .003, .097 2.10* -.009 -.056, .039 -0.36 
 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 8. Descriptive Information for the Surveys 
 
    Survey A Survey B 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 











































Table 9.  Zero-order correlations among the survey measures. 
 
     
  1 2 3 4 
1.  Satisfaction   1.00 -.57 .22 -.52 
2. Desired Attitude Change   -.44 1.00 -.20 .46 
3. Meaning in Life   .24 -.25 1.00 -.24 
4.  Dissonance about Satisfaction   -.42 .28 -.20 1.00 
 
NB:  The correlations for Survey A are above the diagonal and the correlations for Survey B are 











































B: Meaning in life to dissonance 
 
-.21 (.081) -2.66** -.373, -.055 -.144 (.076) -1.89
+
  -.293, .005 
C:  Dissonance to desired attitude 
change 
 
.062 (.015) 4.05*** .033, .091 .032 (.018) 1.81
+
 -.003, .067 
D: Satisfaction to dissonance 
 
-.760 (.079) -9.64*** -.915, -.605 -.584 (.079) -7.40*** -.737, -.431 
E: Satisfaction to desired attitude 
change 
 
-.191 (.024) -8.01*** -.238, -.144 -.163 (.026)  -6.20*** -.214, -.112 
F:  Meaning in life to desired 
attitude change 
 
-.022 (.022) -1.01 -.065, .021 -.066 (.023)  -2.83** -.111, -.021 
       
 
+
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 11.  Descriptive information for the transition to parenthood study 
 
    
Men   Women 
    Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Self-Esteem   5.52 0.93 2.5 7   5.4 0.97 2.3 7 
Satisfaction   7.86 1.42 2 9   7.93 1.48 2 9 
Own Closeness   7.83 1.40 1 9   8.16 1.00 3.6 9 
Perceptions of Partner Closeness   7.73 1.39 2 9   7.7 1.51 1.8 9 
Own Commitment   8.6 1.10 1 9   8.93 0.355 5.33 9 
Perceptions of Partner Commitment   8.68 0.84 2 9   8.61 1.09 1.33 9 
Trust in Partner's Regard   7.2 1.26 3.39 9   7.08 1.47 1.72 9 
Dispositional Trustworthiness   6.51 0.98 3.65 8.75   6.79 0.93 3.95 8.75 
Expected Responsibility   6.29 1.07 2.92 10.17   7.56 0.87 5.58 10.75 





Table 12:  Predicting changes in compensatory commitment (difference score) from the 





















.250, .466  
 .646, .842 




 -.128, .010 
Perceivers’ expectancy violation squared 
 
.008 (.021) 0.372 -.033, .049 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction 
 
-.084 (.031) -2.67** -.145, -.023 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction squared 
 
-.007 (.010) -0.69 -.027, .013 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation 
 
.023 (.029) 0.81 -.034, .080 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation squared 
 
.009 (.017) 0.55 -.024, .042 
Perceivers’ satisfaction squared X expectancy violation 
 
.020 (.014) 1.40 -.007, .047 










* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
CFI = .996, RMSEA = .047, 2(25) = 35.9, p = .07. 
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Table 13:  Predicting changes in commitment from the linear and quadratic effects of 













































 .007, .213 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction squared 
 
-.019 (.017) -1.13 -.052, .014 




 -.009, .151 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation squared 
 
-.031 (.026) -1.18 -.082, .020 




















* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 




Table 14:  Predicting changes in trust from the linear and quadratic effects of expectancy 




































Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction 
 
.058 (.048) 1.21 -.036, .152 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction squared 
 
-.007 (.013) -0.54 -.032, .018 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation 
 
.045 (.030) 1.50 -.014, .104 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation squared 
 
-.043 (.021) -2.06* -.084, -.002 


















Partners’ pre-birth satisfaction 
 
-.112 (.037) -3.01** -.185, -.039 










* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, 2(19) = 18.5, p = .49. 
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Table 15:  Predicting motivational preparedness to meet the partner’s needs from the 











Perceivers’ expectancy violation 
 
-.136 (.050) -2.73** -.234, -.038 
Perceivers’ expectancy violation squared 
 
-.000 (.033) -.010 -.065, .065 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction 
 
.108 (.054) 2.02* .002, .214 
Perceivers’ pre-birth satisfaction squared 
 
-.014 (.018)  -0.77 -.049, .021 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation 
 
.113 (.042) 2.67* .031, .195 
Perceivers’ satisfaction X expectancy violation squared 
 
-.065 (.029) -2.27* -.122, -.008 
Perceivers’ satisfaction squared X expectancy violation 
 
.069W (.029)  















Partners’ pre-birth satisfaction 
 
.150 (.032) 4.68*** .087, .213 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000, 2(21) = 20.27, p = .50. 
 
